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                                                           Abstract  
At the time of writing this thesis, the construction of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is 
advancing. The controversies and cooperation over matters related to  GERD are still up in the air amongst 
Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. This study investigates whether the construction of GERD induces more 
cooperation or conflict amongst these states. When Ethiopia initiated the GERD project in 2011, the 
reactions from the two downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) were totally variegated in a way that Sudan 
avowed and reaffirmed its support whilst Egypt vociferously opposed the project by alleging that the dam 
would infringe her historical water share rights. As a result, political tensions and war threat interactions 
were rampant between  Egypt and Ethiopia. This scenario mounted at the peak following Ethiopia’s tapping 
of the Nile water for the dam’s purpose. Later, the signature of the 2015 tripartite agreement and perpetual 
water diplomacy replenished their interaction. Hence, hydro-political relations amongst these states fluctuate 
from cooperation scenario at a time to conflictive situation at another time. That is why this study aimed to 
clarify the main research question- “is construction of GERD causing cooperation or conflict among the 
Eastern Nile Basin Nations?” 
 
To entertain this question, the study employed a methodology called Framework of Hydro-hegemony as 
developed by Zeitoun and Warner (2006) and later updated by Cascão and Zeitoun (2010).  The analysis of 
this framework centers itself on refining and capturing two water conflict predictions together Frey’s  (1993) 
power-analytic framework and Yoffe et.al’s (2001) scale of water conflict event intensities into one so-called 
the framework of hydro-hegemony. The hydro-political power positions of these nations have been analyzed 
according to the four pillars of power positions: geographic, material, bargaining and ideation. The delve 
study of this research verified Egypt as the basin hydro-hegemon in material, bargaining and ideational 
powers while Ethiopia is leading the geographic power position owing to her upstream location. The study 
also reveals that Ethiopia and Sudan are progressively altering their power positions, which guaranteed them 
to contest Egypt´s incessant hydro-hegemony. Beyond the socio-economic benefits of the GERD, it is also 
served as one of Ethiopia’s counter-hegemony strategies in the basin.  
 
Moreover, the bilateral and multi-lateral interactions of these states have also been evaluated per to Yoffe et. 
al’s  water intensity scale measurement and their outcomes  display moderately positive correlations. 
 
The result of the study constitutes that the construction of GERD is progressively sprouting to open dialogue, 
trust building and cooperation on water share matters among these nations. This contributes a positive asset 
to the durability of peace and security, and integration in the Eastern Nile basin rather than provoking dispute 
and friction in the time period the study extends.  
 
Keywords: Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam, GERD, Framework of hydro-hegemony, hydro-politics, 
Eastern Nile Basin, Conflict and Cooperation, Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Nile River. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1) INTRODUCTION 
  1-1) General Discussion on Relevant Literatures, Backgrounds and Methodologies of the 
Study 
     1-1-1) General Discussions on Relevant Literatures  
Now and in the future, in line with the modifications in technology, economy, social and political 
status of the Nile basin nations, change in natural resource demand and water access right 
contestations, especially on the Nile river water resource, is inevitable. The Nile basin will 
accommodate a variety of demands or water utilization interest rights across historical periods to 
come amongst its riparian states. Depending on the circumstances, these modifications might prone 
these nations either to more cooperation or tensions. Ethiopia initiated to construct the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD herein under) in 2011 and the reactions from the lower riparian 
countries range from a threat of war based opposition to official avowals of support. This thesis 
scrutinizes whether the construction of GERD induces cooperation or dispute amongst Ethiopia, 
Egypt and Sudan.   
The United Nations World Water Development Report (2015) expounds, in many parts of the globe, 
an increasing demand and misuse of water resource is resulting in acute pollution and severing 
water resource urgency. This also have a congruent repercussion on the frequency and intensity of 
local water crisis that in turn have a serious negative “implications for public health, environmental 
sustainability, food and energy security, and economic development”1. Moreover, the report further 
explicates that the presence of adequate amount of water resource to meet the overall global 
demand provided that an alterations have made on current water resource use, management and 
share techniques. 2  
The fact of the matter is that there are more water resources that are unequally and unfairly 
distributed than paucity of water resource. Both water scarcity and mismanagement of water 
abundance are further affected and exacerbated by political changes, mismanagement and climatic 
anomalies. These phenomena create massive upheavals, demographic transformations and stiff 
contestation on access to water. At the same time, the competition for water is manifested in 
demands between different uses: urban versus rural, present uses versus future demands, competing 
regions or countries, water quantity versus water quality and water concerns versus other social 
priorities. This competition is further convoluted by “traditional values and customs, cultural and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO), “Water for a Sustainable World,” 
2015,7. 
2) UNESCO (2015), 7. 
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religious considerations, historical factors and geographical variations”3. Hence, this asserts that the 
current thinking of water resource management detracts from the main notion of the “equitable 
utilization” of the aquifer system among the upstream and downstream nations in trans boundary or 
international rivers.4  
 
Consequently, “international or trans-boundary rivers”, like most other social science terminologies 
has no uniformly concurred connotation. Phrases that are usually used in synonym with these words 
in various researches are “shared rivers” and “watercourse”. Those words are applied 
interchangeably in this study and holding Benveni’s definition for international rivers as: 
“… exclusively of navigational uses all fresh water resources that traverse political 
boundaries that are a collective good to which only the riparian states enjoy access.  Even 
though other states are excluded from using them, the riparian states still need to regulate 
their respective rights and obligations.”5 
 
Globally, the principal source of fresh water for human consumption is the river runoffs. There are 
263 major river systems or basins that cross national boundaries and 85 percent of the river runoffs 
stem from those major international rivers.6 Additionally, Trans-boundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database of Oregon State University conveyed that approximately half of the global fresh water is 
available through international basins and 145 countries have territories that encompass at least one 
shared river basin. 7 
Moreover, when two or more countries rely on the same basin, the use, withdrawal, pollution, or 
management of the upstream countries over the shared river, have both positive and negative 
impacts on the lower riparian countries that could lead to conflict or cooperation depending on the 
circumstances. 8 This thesis examines the act of one of the upper Nile basin riparian country 
(Ethiopia) by constructing the so-called GERD and assesses its implication on the intensity of the 
peace and security situations of trans-riparian countries especially amongst Eastern Blue Nile Basin 
nations: Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3) United Nations (UN), "The United Nations World Water Development Report 2–Water, a Shared Responsibility," 
2015, 373. 
4) United Nations (2015), 373. 
5) Eyal Benvenisti, "Collective action in the utilization of shared freshwater: The challenges of international water 
resources law,” American Journal of International Law 90(3) 1996, 385. 
6) Ashok Swain, “Mission not yet Accomplished: Managing Water Resources in the Nile River Basin," Journal of 
International Affairs 61 (2) (2008), 201. 
7) Ashok Swain, “Water Wars,” International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd (ed.), 25 (2015), 
444. 
8) Swain (2015), 444. 
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Before continuing, it is necessary to shed some lights on the general reasons why “trans boundary 
rivers are more triggering conflict than cooperation at the international level?” Different scholars in 
the field have a variety of positions with respect to this query.  This is crucial to this study since the 
dam is being constructed on one of the longest international river in the world.   
 
First the conflict scenario, according to Morrissette and Borer (2004), water is dubbed as “the oil of 
the twenty-first century” 9. There is a presumption that in water scarce regions especially in the 
Middle East and North Africa, the war over water will replace the pre-existed war over oil. Besides, 
developing countries reliance on the international river water resource system obliges them to 
reorient their national security concerns in order to protect or to preserve supply of water resource.10 
The challenge of competition to control and construction of infrastructures over international water 
resource is not only confined to the recent history of the world but it is also extended to the ancient 
societies of the Sumer and Assyria in Mesopotamia, Pharaonic Egypt, Empire of Peru, and China 
and India, of which the taming of rivers was the catalyst of their evolution.11 
 
According to the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP herein under) 2009 Report, since 
1990 among the violent conflicts rampant in the globe, at least eighteen of them are fueled by the 
exploitation of natural resources. In the last decades, intrastate conflicts that have a nexus with 
natural resources encompassing fresh water and fertile land are intensifying alarmingly.12 The US 
intelligent services assessed that there were at least 10 places in the world where war could 
potentially break out over the shortage of fresh water supplies, with the majority located in the 
Middle East and North Eastern Africa.13  
 
Furthermore, the terminologies “water” and “war” or “conflict” has been indicated conjointly in 
numerous water related researches frequently. The assessment of this terminology emanates from 
the nature and distribution of the international water resource at the global and regional level. Water 
is the most fundamental resource to human survival. It doesn’t have any demarcation or limitations 
in traversing the political boundaries of nations that might have conflictive or cooperative demands 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9) Jason J. Morrissette, and Douglas A. Borer. “Where oil and water do mix: environmental scarcity and future conflict 
in the Middle East and North Africa,” Parameters (Winter 2004/2005), 92. 
10) Morrissette and Borer (2004/2005), 88.	  
11) Eyal Benvenisti, Sharing Transboundary Resources: International Law and Optimal Resource Use, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 39-40. 
12) United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), "From Conflict to Peace building The Role of Natural Resources and 
the Environment," (2009), 6. 
13) UNEP (2009), 6. 
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over it. Besides, the international law that governs the states and the management of international 
basins is rudimentary, incongruous and unforeseeable, (see on chapter two).14  
Pursuant to the 1986 World Resource Institute report, Africa is designated as the poorest continent 
in terms of annual renewable water resources. In comparison to the global renewable water resource, 
Africa’s share embodies less than 9% of which 20% of it constitutes the total rainfall that designates 
the continent as the poorest continent in terms of annual renewable water resource. Large parts of 
the African continent (approximately 66%) lie in the zone where at least part of the year is arid and 
semi- arid. That is also true to the Eastern Blue Nile nations where recurrent droughts severely 
disturb agricultural productions.15 The projected increment of number of population and the poor 
management of water resource in African countries will galvanize the likelihood of water scarcity 
and strain in the time to come. These features also have a direct implication on “food insecurity, 
poor health and damaged ecosystem in many parts of the continent”. 16  
Scholars who contend water is a source of conflict justify their claim in two ways. First, the notion 
of its vitality to all aspects of the nation’s survival from its inhabitants’ biological need to the 
overall economy of states pervasively. Second, the scarcity of water in arid and semi-arid 
environment leads to intense political pressure, often referred to as ‘water stress’. They insist that 
the fierce competition to secure access to water resources among the riparian countries would 
broaden the likelihood for potential interstate conflicts amongst the sharing nations. It is such 
potential for conflict that transfers global water issues to the arena of ‘high politics’ at the 
international level.17 United Nations (UN) officials and World Bank analysts regularly proclaim that 
“the previous war was about oil, the next war will be about water”18. 
Haftendorn, sorts out the type of conflicts that might arise from the common water resource 
disputes point of view as: conflict arising through the use and conflict arising through pollution. 
The first case is related to conflicts based on the utilization of the common water resource by the 
upper riparian countries, for instance, construction of power stations by the upper riparian states 
that might have a harmful effect on the lower riparian countries’ water resource interests. 19 
Utilization based conflicts are also further divided in to two sub-categories: a relative conflict of 
distribution that exists when there is an abundant common water resource but there will be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14) UNEP (2009),	  6.	  
15) United Nations (UN), "The United Nations World Water Development Report 4–Water," 2012, 177-179. 
16) United Nations (UN) (2012), 178. 
17) UNEP (2009), 6. 
18) UNEP (2009), 6. 
19) Helga Haftendorn, "Water and international conflict," Third World Quarterly 21(1) (2000), 51-53.	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inequality over the use of the water resource between the upper and the lower-riparian countries. An 
absolute conflict distribution occurs when there is no enough water resource to satiate the legitimate 
needs and interests of the riparian countries.20   
 
Thereupon, one can recite any conflict that might arise because of the construction of GERD for 
hydroelectric purposes as utilization based conflict. Egypt’s position towards this dam is based 
upon the allegation of the obstruction of the normal water flow of the River and diminishes her 
historical water share right (see on chapter four). In other words, the dam might minimize the 
amount of water reaching to the lower riparian countries in general and Egypt, in particular that 
catalyzes conflict of water share right interests. Whether the construction of this dam is causing 
water resource use type of conflicts or cooperation among the three Eastern Blue Nile basin nations, 
is the main question of this study that will be addressed at its last chapter.  
The other case of conflict transpires when rivers are taken as the means to dispose the wastes of 
industrial products and the quality of water diminishes. Controversies caused by the contamination 
of the river by itself and cleaning the water will put those nations that share the river into 
contestation and tension.21 This category is beyond the scope of the purpose of this thesis and 
further discussion is not provided in this regard. The reason behind is that the thesis limits itself to 
the utilization aspect of the trans boundary river water resource that does not incorporate the 
pollution of the river water. 
However, after discussing the categorization in detail Haftendorn hold that: 
“In contrast to a conflict arising over pollution, which can result in tension between the 
states, a conflict of distribution can lead towards violence or military threats. In relative 
distributional conflicts, the situation is aggravated if the lower riparian cannot prevent a 
detrimental action by the upper riparian. In this case, the survival of the lower-lying state 
comes into question and this can lead to its use of military action. In the past, conflicts 
between Syria and Iraq over the Euphrates, between Israel and its Arab neighbors over the 
Litani and the Jordan water flow have led to violence on these grounds.”22  
The adherents of this tenet hold that there are several countries that are in dispute over the sharing 
of their common rivers. Furthermore, the Nile, Jordan, Euphrates-Tigris, Danube, Indus and Ganges 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20) Haftendorn (2000), 53. 
21) Haftendorn (2000), 54.	  
22) Haftendorn (2000), 57. 
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recited as international rivers that induce conflict in the future.23 With the exception of the Jordan 
basin, most international water conflicts have not led to physical violence. However, the threat of 
the use of arms in these cases is not unusual. Water as a sole cause for major war at state level is 
arduous to prove till now except small skirmish cases. There are also feasibilities that water scarcity 
might indirectly contribute to food scarcity and then population displacement and ethnic alignment, 
which can lead to internal disturbances and political instability and ultimately result in intrastate 
war.24  
 
Second, the wider school of thought alleges that shared water or international rivers are not only 
creating competition and conflict or tension among the sharing riparians but also they are playing a 
crucial role in establishing cooperation and dual or multiple engagements. The plain justification for 
this cooperation is riparian mutual dependence as the withdrawal or pollution of the river water at 
one of the stream countries will have repercussions on the water source of the other sharing state 
that might be prone to dispute and tension among those nations. To curb such disputes, cooperation 
and mutual understanding among the stream sharing countries is mandatory and inevitable. Scholars 
attempt to substantiate their position with the signing of 145 water related treaties in the last century 
and procreation of many regional and international water regimes and institutions among the 
riparian nations across the globe particularly to address water pollution and water share 
management matters. Additionally, they hold that the absence of war over water resources is one of 
the manifestations of the eminence of the assertion that water is creating more cooperation than 
tensions as a shared resource. 25 
 
As a result, a competing theory that discards the sole principle of water mainly causes war, has 
emerged. According to this new tenet water will fuel greater interdependence –thus it is the means 
to peace rather than conflict. Although water as a ‘pathway to peace’ is a simplistic slogan, “the 
challenges of optimal water planning have brought some of the world’s most implacable enemies to 
the negotiation table and led to agreements and institutions that survived strained relations”26. Tvedt 
(2010) further explained that for the Nile Basin countries, both options (conflict or cooperation) 
have been available and continue to be available, and the Nile issue will never be settled once and 
for all. He further alleges, “…the Nile waters might become a pathway to peace or a currency of 
war, or both, at different history”27. This is one of the lacunas that fascinated the writer of this study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23) Swain (2015), 444. 
24) Swain (2015), 444. 
25) Swain (2015), 444. 
26) Terje Tvedt, The river Nile in the post-colonial age: conflict and cooperation among the Nile Basin countries 
(London, New York: IB Tauris, 2010), 237. 
27) Tvedt (2010), 238.  
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to ponder on examining the intensity of the interactions amongst those selected Eastern Nile basin 
nations especially after the construction of GERD on the Nile river (is it leading more to conflict or 
cooperation?). 
     
   1-1-2) Backgrounds of the Study 
The Nile is the 2nd longest river in the world crossing 6,700 kilometers through eleven north- 
eastern African counties; Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the 
Sudan, Egypt and South Sudan.  Its two main tributaries are the White Nile and Blue Nile. The 
former comprises 14% of the Nile river and starts flowing from Burundi and through the Equatorial 
Lakes, provides, a small but steady flow that is fed by the permanent snows of the Ruwenzori (the 
‘rain giver’) mountains. While the latter, contributes 86% of the Nile River descending from the 
lofty Ethiopian ‘water tower’ highlands. The Blue Nile is characterized by a seasonal fluctuation 
and its tributaries are the Blue Nile, Baro-Akobo (Sobat) and Tekesse (Atbara) contributing 59%, 
14%and 13% respectively of the whole river content.28  
 
To systematize the study, this research also employs two sub-basin categorizations: the Eastern Nile 
basin encompassing Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea and Egypt and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Basin 
comprising the rest of the Nile riparian countries (mentioned above) plus Sudan and Egypt. As the 
title of this thesis states, the focus of this study is on the Eastern Nile basin countries with the 
exception of Eritrea due to its minimal water resource contribution and involvement in the basin 
system. Beyond that the construction of the GERD is undergoing close to Ethio-Sudanese boarder 
that has insignificant interlink to Eritrea’s water resource interests in whatsoever way. The new 
independent nation of South Sudan is not also incorporated in this study owing to the encumbrances 
of getting relevant sources though it is part and parcel of the Eastern Nile basin. Hence, in this study 
the term “Eastern Nile Basin ” states indicates the three countries that embrace Ethiopia, Sudan and 
Egypt.  
Among the 300 million populations of the Nile Basin countries more than half rely on the Nile 
River for survival. The population growth in the Eastern Nile basin countries will reach to 340 by 
2050 according to the current population growth rate projections. This phenomenon will have an 
alarming impact in minimizing the per capita water availability in the basin. 29  
It is believed that the River also enabled the development of ancient civilizations in the region such 
as Meroe and Axum. It is traditionally considered as a holy river in most of these regions. From 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28) Ashok Swain, "Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute," The Journal of Modern African Studies 
35(04) (1997), 675; Ashok Swain, “Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing 
climate,” Hydrological Sciences Journal 56, no. 4 (2011), 688. 
29) Ashok Swain, "Mission not yet accomplished: managing water resources in the Nile River basin" Journal of 
International Affairs 61 (2) (2008), 202. 
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ancient times onwards, Egypt has relied on the Nile River. Owing to the importance of the river in 
the arid and semi-arid areas of the region, it has been the cause for a number of previous conflicts 
such as the Egyptian war to control the source of the Nile River with Ethiopia at the battles of 
Gundet and Guta in 1875 and 1876, respectively.30  
 
After European colonization in Africa, a number of multi-lateral and bilateral treaties were signed 
regarding the share of water resources. In April 1891, Britain and Italy signed a protocol that 
prohibited the construction of any irrigation projects on one of the tributaries of the Blue Nile called 
the Atbara. Ethiopia and Britain (on behalf of the Sudan and Egypt) made a bilateral treaty 
stipulating, “nothing should be built across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or Sobat, that might impede 
the flow of the Nile”.31  
Furthermore, colonial powers of France, Britain and Italy in 1906, and Britain and Italy in 1925 
made an agreement curbing any upstream diversions of water on the Nile River. In 1929 the Nile 
Waters Agreement affirming the Egyptian historic and established right on the River was reached. 
According to this agreement, Egypt and Sudan allocated 48 Billion Cubic Meter (BCM herein 
under) and 4 BCM of the river water, respectively.  This agreement granted Egypt the right to 
monitor the Nile flow utterly including the right to veto on the construction of any projects by 
upstream nations. This agreement evidently explicated that ‘no works were to be constructed on the 
Nile or its tributaries or the equatorial lakes, so far as they were under British jurisdiction, which 
would alter the flows entering Egypt without her prior approval’32. The 1959 agreement between 
Egypt and Sudan reassured the resettlement of the water share controversy by increasing their water 
share to 55.5 BCM and 18.5 BCM, respectively.33  
Recognizing the need for immediate cooperation, nine of the ten Nile Basin countries launched the 
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in May 1999. The main objective of the initiative was to develop the 
Nile’s water resources in a sustainable and equitable way, ensure efficiency of management and 
resources, promote cooperation and joint-action, target poverty and promote economic integration, 
and to guarantee that NBI plans are acted upon, as lucidly stipulated in its initiative plans. The 
initiative encompasses three bodies, Nile-COM, the Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC), 
and the NBI Secretariat (Nile-SEC). 34As we can infer from the above explanations, legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30) Swain (2008), 202.  
31) Swain (2008), 202. 
32) Swain (1997), 676.  
33) Swain (1997), 676. 
34) Nile Basin Initiative, “Corporate Report –2010, ” www.nilebasin.org accessed on March 28, 2015. 
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apparatuses dating back to colonial times have sustained Egypt’s regional hegemony over the river 
water. Evidently, when Sudan asked for a renegotiation to increase its apportion of the water share 
on the river owing to its growing population, Egypt refused.35  
Conversely, from the very start, Ethiopia has denounced most of these agreements made during the 
colonial era and the bilateral water share agreements of Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia alleges that none 
of those agreements incorporate her legitimate water share interests though the country is the source 
of the Blue Nile and contributes about 86% of the river water. In 1957, Ethiopia proclaimed the 
unilateral developments of projects on the Nile that was contested by both Egypt and Sudan. In 
1963, when Ethiopia claimed 6 BCM of water per year, her claim was totally abated by those 
downstream countries of the basin.36  
Following Ethiopia’s unilateral declaration of water projects on the Nile in 1979, Egypt’s President 
during that time, Anwar Sadat replied “If Ethiopia takes any action to block our right to the Nile 
water, there will be no alternative for us but to use force”. The Egyptian Prime Minister Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali while he was serving as the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs of Egypt (from 1977 
till 1991) once said, "the next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics". 
Other upper riparian countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, claim their right to a share of 
water resources on the river but were repeatedly quashed by Egypt.37 
In the middle of this long process, increasing water share demand request, historical ups and downs 
that Ethiopia have started to construct its giant hydroelectric power dam called the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD herein after) in 2011.  This ambitious project is planned to generate over 
5,000 Megawatts (herein under MW) of electricity by creating a lake with a volume of over 60 
BCM of water. The dam will cost Ethiopia opportunities around $5 billion and upon completion 
will supply electricity domestically and also distribute surplus energy to neighboring countries. This 
certifies the wider objective of the dam in benefiting the neighboring countries from the 
hydroelectric power. However, Egypt and Sudan are suspicious that the volume of water reaching 
to countries downstream would diminish as a result of the construction of the dam. 38  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35) Swain (1997), 677. 
36) Swain (1997), 677. 
37 ) Ashok Swain and Isabel Nanton, “Nile: The Troubled Waters,” The Africa Report, May 25,2009, 
http://www.theafricareport.com/ashok-swain-and-isabel-nanton.html accessed on March 8,2016; Peter H. Gleick, 
"Water and conflict: Fresh water resources and international security," International security 18, no. 1 (1993), 86. 
38) Dale Whittington, John Waterbury, and Marc Jeuland, "The Grand Renaissance Dam and prospects for cooperation 
on the Eastern Nile," Water Policy 16(4) (2014), 595-96. 
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In September 2011, the three countries established a team of experts to assess the effects of the dam 
on the flow of the Nile River. This team reported that the dam would not have a substantial effect 
on the flow of the river. However, Egypt´s authorities rejected the report. The Sudanese government 
on the other hand, agrees with Ethiopia´s assertions as it “would get many benefits from the dam, 
including better supply of electricity and year-long regulation of the Blue Nile’s flow” and called 
upon Egypt to stop provocations of a “water war” in the Nile Basin nations.39  
When Ethiopia started to divert the water for the purpose of the dam, political controversies and 
tensions increased, particularly between Egypt and Ethiopia. Water is a national security issue for 
Egypt as most of the country’s farmers depend on the Nile River for agricultural irrigation.40 
Egyptian politician, Sheikh Abdel-Akher Hammad (Egypt’s Islamic religious political leader), 
argued the construction of the Dam as tantamount to ‘a declaration of war by Ethiopia on Egypt”41. 
There were political discussions in Egypt with suggestions of military action. Despite these political 
threats and tensions, Ethiopia has continued the construction of the dam.42 
On the contrary, there are still ongoing efforts in making multilateral and bilateral agreements so as 
to achieve cooperation between Eastern Blue Nile countries. One of these developments is an 
agreement declaring to end the water dispute on the Nile River signed on March 2015. This 
agreement mainly focuses on the GERD signatories have reached a 'Declaration of Principles' on 
regional cooperation, sustainable use of the water resources on the Blue Nile, peaceful settlement of 
disputes, and principle of developing trust among those nations. This agreement is based on general 
principles and lacks detailed information. Some scholars, however, have indicated that this is one 
step in the right direction to resolve widespread water dispute tensions in the region, especially after 
the construction of the GERD. 43 
As the study showed above in the general discussion, international rivers could be a cause for 
conflict or cooperation. Particularly, the construction of infrastructures on the shared river might 
lead to utilization-based conflict as it might have some impact on the lower riparian countries as the 
Egyptian authorities alleging on the GERD case.  Pursuant to Gleick, there are features of water to 
be considered as a source of strategic competition among the basin countries: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39) Zeray Yihdego, "The Blue Nile dam controversy in the eyes of international law," Global Water Forum, (2013), 
http://www.globalwaterforum.org accessed on March 20, 2015. 
40) Yihdego (2013). 
41) Ahramonline, “Ethiopia dam is ‘declaration of war’: AL Gamaa Al-Islamiya,” 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/72730/Egypt/0/Ethiopia-dam-is-declaration-of-war-AlGamaa-
AlIslam.aspx accessed on March 12, 2016. 
42) Yihdego (2013). 
43) International water law Project, “Declaration of Principles of Agreement' signed by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia,” 
http://internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/africa.htmlaccessed March 14, 2015. 
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“(1) the degree of scarcity, (2) the extent to which the water supply is shared by more than 
one region or state, (3) the relative power of the basin states, and (4) the ease of access to 
alternative fresh water sources. Perhaps the clearest example of a region where fresh water 
supplies have had strategic implications is the Middle East.”44   
In this regard, the current Nile water dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia conforms to the water 
based strategic competition yardsticks of Gleick as one can deduce them from our upcoming 
discussions of this thesis.  
Moreover, the hydro-politics relations of these nations have been categorized by many scholars in 
the field as a manifestation of a clear imbalance of power whereby the water resource interaction is 
considered to be competitive but stifled (as Egypt emerged instructive in riparian circumstances to 
establish negative or dominative form of hydro-hegemony in the region). In this aspect Waterbury 
holds:  
 “Egypt is by far the most powerful riparian . . . it still has formidable veto power. It has 
been successful in imposing the status quo for four decades and it will surely shape any 
change in the status quo. It cannot dictate terms, but no riparian, including Ethiopia, will 
seek, let alone welcome, confrontation with Egypt when its well-known national interests 
are at stake.” 45  
However, the recent hydro-hegemonic political developments in the region following the 
construction of the GERD query the historically unbridled status of Egyptian negative hydro-
hegemonic domination in the region. Owing to this reason, the implications of GERD project on the 
hydro-politics, and the peace and security of the region, is worth studying. Hence, the frameworks 
of hydro-hegemony and counter hydro-hegemony will be employed to examine the intensity of the 
conflict or tension or cooperation among the selected countries. Focus will be given to studying the 
shift in hydropower relations and counter-hegemony scenarios and their implication on the peace 
and security of the region after Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to construct the GERD. Regarding the 
methodologies applicable and the details of what kinds of sources will be employed, are iterated in 
the following sub-sections. 
      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44) Peter H. Gleick, “Reducing the Risk of Water-Related Conflict in the Middle East,” in Practical Peacemaking in the 
Middle East, ed. Steven L.Spiegel and David J.Pervin, (New York: Routledge, 2012) Chapter 8. 
45) John Waterbury, The Nile Basin: National determinants of collective action (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2008), 167.  
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1-1-3) Framework of Hydro-hegemony  
Zouiton and Warner´s (2006) hydro-hegemony framework, focuses on assessing how powerful 
riparian states subtly maintain their control of trans-boundary water resources. Moreover, 
combining the political power relations, hydro-hegemony and intensity of conflict, the research will 
analyze the current level of water based conflict or cooperation in the region specifically after the 
construction of the dam initiated. 46   Water as a scarce resource, ecological factors, and 
securitization and identity concepts will also be used as ancillary approaches to augment the 
research.  	  
The competing interests of these riparian countries mostly do not lead to war as it is suppressed by 
the imbalances of power and has little to do with the seemingly perceived cooperation among them 
as well. For instance, Turkey has an upstream position on the Tigris and the Euphrates River and 
can built the GAP (Gu¨neydog˘u Anadolu Projesi) dam on the River by employing her geographical 
location as an advantage. Analogously, what is preventing the upstream Ethiopia from doing the 
same on the Nile? Those scholars replied “power play” is the principal determinant factor for how 
much and why the water resource in a riparian state could be accessed in international rivers?47 
Ethiopia is constructing the GERD on the Nile without consulting the lower riparian nations while 
the latter especially Egypt, is opposing it. What is the implication of this act on the hydro “power 
play” in the region? requires further examination.  
 
Before elaborating the framework of hydro-hegemony, it is crucial to define and in what sense the 
word “hegemony” is applicable in this study. The root of the word hegemony is the Greek 
“hegeisthai” meaning “to lead” or “someone who is guiding the way”48. There are differences 
between leadership buttressed by authority called hegemony vis-à-vis leadership reinforced by 
coercion known as dominance. And hence, the concept of hegemony attempts to expound, “how 
groups with power (also known as hegemons) can maintain their pole position (control)” without 
employing despotism or repression by defining the rules of the game. The “hydro-hegemony” is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46) Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, "Hydro-hegemony–a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts," 
Water policy 8(5) (2006); Warner J and Zeitoun M, “International relations theory and water do mix: Hydro- hegemony 
and international water relations,” Political Geography 27(7) (2008), 802–10; Ana E. Cascão, “Changing power 
relations in the Nile River Basin: Unilateralism vs. cooperation,” Water Alternatives 2(2) (2009); Ana E. Cascão, 
“Ethiopia Challenges Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile Basin,” Water Policy 10(S2)(2008), 13-26; Alan Nicol and Ana 
Elisa Cascão, “Against the flow -- new power dynamics and upstream mobilization in the Nile Basin,” Review of 
African Political Economy 38 (128) (2011), 317-325; Mirumachia N. and K. Chana, “Anthropocentric Hydro Politics? 
Key Developments in the Analysis of International Trans boundary Water Politics and some Suggestions for Moving 
Forward,” Aquatic Procedia 2 (2014), 9–15; Naho Mirumachi, Transboundary Water Politics in Developing World, 
(New York: Routledge 2015). 
47) Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 436. 
48) Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 438-439. 
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term used to refer to the particular application and manifestation of this power in the international 
water sector relations. 49  
 
Depending on the provision of advantages of the riparian countries, hydro-hegemony could be 
classified as: positive or negative (dominative). Positive hydro-hegemony exists when the hegemon 
plays a guiding role and takes actions that are beneficiary for all or most of the riparian countries. 
Whilst negative hydro-hegemon aggravates the preexisted gaps between the powerful and the weak 
that in turn results in inequality within the basin system. Pursuant to Zeitoun and Warner, most of 
the hydro-hegemony in international rivers overlies between those two extreme poles of leadership 
(positive) and oppressive domination (negative) positions. And the latter one more utters Egypt’s 
hydro hegemony in the Nile Basin. 50  
 
Warner and Zeitoun (2006) explained that the analysis of this framework bases itself on refining 
and capturing two water conflict predictions together Yoffe (2001) scale of water conflict event 
intensities and Frey’s  (1993) power-analytic framework into one so-called the framework of hydro-
hegemony. Moreover, the reflection of the power asymmetries and conflict intensities concurrently 
on this framework will add up the accuracy of the analysis of the stability of the riparian countries 
in general and the Eastern Blue Nile countries in this study context. 51 Just as Frey, “the least stable 
situation is when the downstream nation is most powerful and has most interest in water but the 
upstream nations also having considerable interest”52. Analogues with this context, Egypt’s water 
interest in the Nile river and her powerful hydro hegemony on the one hand and other riparian 
nations (Ethiopia’s and Sudan’s) unrelenting demand to secure their water share in the basin on the 
other hand, might lead to the most volatile situation in the region. With the same analysis, the 
situation whereby the unilateral construction of the GERD by the non-hegemon Ethiopia while the 
hydro hegemon in the Basin (Egypt) is opposing it, surges the tendency to the least instable 
circumstance in the region. By pondering at the actual circumstances and measuring the event 
interactions of intensity scale of Yoffe et al, this study will scrutinize the accuracy of such views 
under the last chapter.   
Thus, the thesis aims to elucidate how historical laden extreme power asymmetries contribute to 
hydro-hegemony dynamics in the region plus examines the current status and changes of power by 
emphasizing on the construction of the GERD. Framework of hydro-hegemony (that also 
incorporates both ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ power) as will be assessed from the perspective of its four 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49) Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 439. 
50)  Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 438. 
51)  Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 437. 
52)  Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 437. 
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dimensions of power as defined by Zeitoun and Warner (2006) and more updated by Cascão and 
Zeitoun (2010). 
First, geographic power is related to an overt power that could be earned because of the nation’s 
riparian position on the river. In this case, a country in the upstream position has a relatively more 
influential power position than the lower riparian countries. In other words, the hegemonic power 
relies on the distinct advantage that geography provides to an upstream state to manipulate the 
flows of the shared river.53  	  This is true in the case of most of international rivers; one can take the case of Turkey’s hegemonic 
power over the Tigris Basin due to her upper stream position. However, our previous premise 
appears to be futile when interlinked to the Nile basin as a downstream country Egypt has a 
dominative hydro hegemony power over the upstream countries (including Ethiopia).54 Detail 
historical, legal and geopolitical justifications will be provided for Egypt’s hegemony in the region 
in the upcoming chapters of this thesis. The unilateral decision and construction of the GERD by 
the upstream state (Ethiopia) could be seen from the angle of its geographic position of the country. 
That indicates locational power play a key role in determining hegemonic or counter-hegemonic 
power in the Nile basin as well (see on Chapter Four).  
 
Second, material power, being the most visible and overt type of power, it encompasses “economic 
power, military might, technological prowess and international political and financial support”55. It 
is much more influential especially when it is cumulatively availed with bargaining and ideational 
dimensions of powers. The recent material powers of the Eastern Nile countries will also be studied 
under the last chapter to show changes and the gaps or the status quo paradigms in detail. 56  
Third, bargaining power is about the ability of a riparian state to regulate the “rules of the game and 
set agendas” in matters of the shared water resources. Terms of treaties and negotiations, and the 
parties of the treaties, will also be defined by those hegemon nations by influencing the weaker 
nations through incentives to comply with their decisions and positions. At least for the past forty 
years after her independence, Egypt has managed to keep her bargaining power incessantly. 
According to Buzan, Egypt has made the Nile issue into a “national security issue” by declaring, 
“Egypt is the gift of the Nile and the Nile is the gift of Egypt”57 .Can this argument hold water after 
the GERD? (I.e., will the bargaining power of Egypt continue or will it be disrupted by the latest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53) Cascão and Zeitoun (2010), 31; Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 442-443. 
54) Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 439. 
55) Cascão and Zeitoun (2010), 31. 
56) Cascão and Zeitoun (2010), 31. 
57) Cascão and Zeitoun (2010), 31.	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developments in the basin? And what are the implications of this disruption (if there is any) on the 
peace and security of the region? How about Egypt’s securitization of the shared water resource vis-
à-vis the development of international water law principles like the equitable utilization of water 
resource? 
Fourthly, ideational power denotes ‘power over idea’ and construction of knowledge that 
“represents the capacity of a riparian to impose and legitimize particular ideas and narratives” 58. 
Cascão and Zeitoun (2010) has stated:  
“..ideational power allows the basin hegemon to control the perceptions of the allocative 
configuration of the societies both in its own country and in the neighboring riparian 
countries, thereby reinforcing its legitimacy. An abstract conception, ideational power may 
be exercised through knowledge structures, sanctioned discourse and the imposition of 
narratives and storylines”59  
To what extent is this power practically employed by the hydro hegemon (Egypt) towards the 
Eastern Nile basin countries? What are their implications on the recent developments, and the peace 
and security of the region? 
The strategies and tactics employed by the hydro-hegemons to secure its status quo power interests 
are also part and parcel of the framework. Those tactics and strategies generally incorporate 
coercive, utilitarian, normative agreement and ideological hegemony. The interactions over the 
trans boundary hydro hegemony ranges from the shared control (cooperative control), consolidated 
control (competitive but stifled) and contested control (competitive and cut throat). Egypt’s hydro 
hegemony is categorized by full of competition over the water share but this contestation has been 
stifled by the hydro hegemony in the region and that is the main justification behind Egypt’s 
hegemony is to be dubbed as “consolidated control” type.60  
The other core issue that will be entertained with the concept of hydro hegemony is counter –
hegemony principle that emphasis on the states’ perceived as a non-hegemon takes counter 
strategies to mend their previous situation and to achieve the “shared control” of the resource for 
the whole basin states with the hydro-hegemon. The other paradigm of this principle lies on the 
resort of the non-hegemonic states directly to agenda framing. Such counter power includes 
“recourse to morality and international law, delay, de-securitization, issue linkage, economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58) Cascão and Zeitoun (2010), 32. 
59) Cascão and Zeitoun (2010), 32. 
60) Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 444; Cascão and Zeitoun (2010), 30-31. 
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development, alternative funding sources, negotiations and generation of positive-sum outcomes”61. 
Related to this tenet, chapter four addresses whether the construction of GERD tantamount to one 
of counter-hegemony strategies of Ethiopia against Egypt historical hydro hegemonic power in the 
Nile basin or not?  
Obviously, Egypt has been the most powerful riparian among the Eastern Nile Basin nations in each 
of those dimensions of hydro hegemony discussed above for ages. However, the recent 
developments in the basin, particularly, the construction of the GERD is raising doubts as to what 
extent Egypt’s hydro hegemony keeps intact without disruption? Do those developments by the 
upstream countries affect the intensity of conflict or cooperation in the region and what are their 
implication on the general peace and security of the region? 
Hence, the foundation of this framework of hydro hegemony overlies on the principle that powerful 
riparian states determine the management and control of the water resource in trans boundary rivers. 
It also tries to address the queries such as “who gets how much of the water resource, how and 
why?” which is mostly the reasons for conflict on water sharing stream countries. According to 
Zeitoun and Warner (2006), “there are dozens of destructive but largely silent water conflicts lie 
somewhere between the much feared but non-existent water wars and the much lauded examples of 
trans-boundary water cooperation”62. Within those extreme ranges of interactions of the riparian 
states, one could infer numbers of intensities of conflict that are silent water conflicts in lieu of 
violent conflicts among basin nations. By way of explanation, the hydro hegemony framework is a 
systematic way of conflict analysis by “examining the implications of varying intensities of conflict 
and the dynamics of hegemony at the river basin level”63. This thesis will also systematically 
analyze water related conflict intensities in the Blue Nile Basin after the unilateral decision of 
Ethiopia to construct the GERD on the River and its implication on the peace and security for the 
region. 
 
Shira Yoffe and Kelli Larson studied the Basin at Risk Database (BAR) by identifying historical 
indicators of the international freshwater conflict from which they evaluated the future potential risk 
of these basins. They also compiled the event data from news articles by using electronically 
searchable news database within a specified time frame. 64 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61) Cascão and Zeitoun (2010), 32; Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 454. 
62) Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 437. 
63) Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 436.  64)To study the details of the methodology and systematize and customize it to this particular study the author consulted 
the Oregon State University Basin at Risk Database (BAR) and number of documents such as :Introduction of the 
database by Shira Yoffe, Water event database Methodology by Shira Yoffe and Kelli Larson, Use of GIS for Analysis 
of Indicators of Conflict and Cooperation Over International Freshwater Resources by Shira Yoffe and Greg Fiske, 
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Likewise, in order to measure the intensity of interactions among these riparian nations following 
the construction of GERD and to research whether these political interactions are leading to conflict 
or cooperation, the study will interpret and analyze the data gathered from governmental based 
media source (http://www.waltainfo.com from Ethiopian government, and 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/ from Egyptian government source and http://gmsudan.sd/en/ from Sudan 
government source), two international medias (BBC-http://www.bbc.com and Aljazeera  
http://www.aljazeera.com) and one private media  (Sudan Tribune http://www.sudantribune.com ). 
Private, governmental and international based medias are also employed so as to ascertain the 
diversification of media sources. The major interaction events of those media sources between the 
year when Ethiopia declared the construction of the GERD (2011) until December 31, 2015, will be 
considered and registered. The contents of this data are studied thoroughly so as to evaluate and 
quantify them under the Yoffe’s measurements. To articulate the study of the possible event 
interactions the study categorized the states as bilateral (between Ethiopia and Egypt, Egypt and 
Sudan, and Sudan and Ethiopia) and multilateral (interaction among those three nations: Ethiopia, 
Egypt and Sudan). The source of the data will also be mentioned and the events will be designated 
with numbers in line with the conflict intensity scale developed by Shira Yoffe and Kelli Larson in 
the BAR analysis. The scale ranges from +7 denoting the most cooperative event, 0 neutral event 
and to -7 which represents the most conflictive scenario (for the details see Table-1 below).  
Table-1) Water Conflict/Cooperation Intensity Scale  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Conflict and Cooperation Over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators and Findings of the Basins at Risk 
Project, Shira Yoffe, Aaron T. Wolf, and Mark Giordano. Additionally, appendices from the same database: Field 
Descriptions for Event Database, Changes to TFDD Basin Coverage, GIS Data Calculated By BAR, Events By Basin, 
Events by Dyad, Approach to Initial Indicator Selection, List of GIS and Other Data Layers, Precipitation Data 
Methodology, Derivation of Climate Zone By Basin, Codes and Regional Groupings, Active Nationalist Movements, 
Statistical Graphs, Data Tables Identifying Basins At Risk accessible at 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/basins_at_risk/index.html, on March 29,2016.	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Source: Yoffe et al. (2003). 
This water event intensity scale is so detail that it demonstrates each of the different conflict and 
cooperation levels. That also makes easier to evaluate the level of water-based interaction of the 
Eastern Nile states. Consider for example, the difference in the effect on relations provoked by a 
“formal declaration of war” with those provoked by a “mild verbal expression”. Secondly, the scale 
demonstrates that even the less-intense conflicts, are still forms of conflict. In other words, the 
absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict. This is relevant for addressing the research 
question of this study as one can witness until now there is no manifest war fought among the 
aforementioned Eastern Nile Basin countries upon the construction of GERD but there are 
divergences and agreements. In clarifying the tension or cooperation levels of these nations, the 
event intensity scale measurement is so detail and vital in addressing detailed water political and 
diplomatic relations in the basin.  
Conflict will be interpreted in a vast range of degrees. For example, the five ranges of NATO 
(conflict-development scale of 1999 identified as durable peace, stable peace, unstable peace, crisis 
and then war. These ranges are also examined cumulatively with the Yoffe et al’s water event 
intensity scale (for details see on table 2 below).  
Table 2-Conflict Intensity Frame  
 
Source: Zeitoun and Warner (2006) 
Accordingly, designating the interactions in terms of numbers of scales from  +7 down to -7 to 
measure the level of intensities of conflict will help one to define the current relations among those 
nations that will also serve as a component in evaluating the hydro hegemony contestation level and 
asses the peace and security situation in the region. Thus, the conflict intensity frame indicates that 
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the discrepancies in intensity of different conflicts and the trending of the degree that same conflict 
has gone through over time.  
 
These methodologies are combined to provide a powerful and insightful analysis on the possible 
drivers of conflict or cooperation in the construction of the GERD in the Eastern Nile basin. The 
theorization of hydro hegemony and counter hegemony principles and the tactics of the Eastern 
Nile nations to protect their water share rights dealt cumulatively with the analysis and 
quantification of major event interactions so as to reach the final conclusive remark (whether the 
unilateral decision of Ethiopia to construct the GERD on the Nile river, is becoming the means to 
wider peace or triggering conflict among or between Eastern Nile nations?)  
 
Moreover, this research accommodates horizons of sources including speeches of political leaders, 
press conferences provided by the highest authoritative figures, parliament addresses, interviews, 
political debates, pacts and agreements, international water organizations’ reports, researches in the 
area, governmental institution based political views of these countries, international and local media 
reports, and international impact assessment reports about the GERD. The thesis attempted to 
specify and limit these sources by relying on issues related to the thesis and directing on the 
influential political leaders in those nations. 
Finally, the study will be augmented by the prior elaborations on international trans boundary laws 
(chapter two) as they are part of so-called soft (ideational and bargaining) power component in 
hydro hegemony, and the general historical, legal and geopolitical discussions at (chapter three) that 
in aggregate demystify hydraulic power relations in the region. Entertaining these issues equips the 
reader to understand the governing international legal precepts and the general hydro hegemony 
circumstances in the region so as to prepare for the detailed elaboration and address of the main 
research questions in the last and fourth chapter. At the end, the material, geographical, bargaining 
and ideational powers of those nations will be discussed in detail to elucidate power interactions 
among themselves and what kind of effect it might have on the peace and security of the region 
after their major interactions are gauged with Yoffe’s intensity scale. This study entertains its final 
analysis, conclusive remarks and recommendation by taking all theories discussed and data 
collected above in toto.  
 
 
 
	   20	  
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
2) INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW AND FRAMEWORK OF HYDRO-HEGEMONEY  
     2-1) General Discussion on International Law   
Presently, the advancement of technology and the growth of population are paving the way for an 
incremental and susceptible utilization of natural resources such as fresh water, clean air, fisheries, 
hydrocarbon and mineral deposits, forests nature reserves, and imperiling species of flora and fauna 
en masse. The   entire ecological system is under strain and scarcity of these natural resources is 
becoming an inevitable phenomenon. As a result, the competitions for accessing these resources are 
becoming more frequent and stiff. In addition, their control and management have been subjected to 
certain domestic political borders and delineations. However, the repercussions of the 
mismanagement or defective utilization of these natural resources is not confined to a particular 
state instead it is pervasive and sometimes outreaches to the whole globe. For instance, the pollution 
of a trans boundary river in one state will have an impact on access to freshwater to other 
neighboring nations that the river crosses. The deforestation of forest in a certain locality will have 
an impact on global warming. 65  
According to the 2002 UNEP report, if an alteration is not made on the current utilization and 
development arrangements of water resources, more than half of the world’s population will suffer 
as the result of water scarcity. This situation is more acute in the case of developing nations 
including of the Eastern Nile Basin countries. 66Moreover, many sovereign nations consider water 
resource development as a pertinent vehicle to alleviate poverty and stimulate their economic 
growth. These nations wish to obtain economic benefits, such as flood control, irrigation and 
hydropower development activities.67	   
Hence, the inevitability of the scarcity threat of water resource on the one hand, the major problem 
in the management of the international rivers by sharing sovereign states on the other, makes the 
trans boundary water conflicts a more ubiquitous phenomenon. Water conflicts both in developed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65) Benvenisti (2002), 15. 
66) United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), "The greening of Water Law: Managing Freshwater Resources for 
People and the Environment," (2002), 1. 
67) Benvenisti (2002), 15. 
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and developing nations are becoming the cause for political, economic, environmental and social 
insecurities.68 The Eastern Nile Basin region is not an exception to this rule.  
At the international level the United Nations is in charge of the maintenance of peace and security 
as stipulated under Article (1) paragraph (1) of the UN Charter. In order to achieve this objective, 
the UN and its bodies devised a customary international water law, the two best known 
international legal instruments dealing with shared water courses: the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of 1997 and Helsinki Rules 
on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers and Comments of 1966.69  
This section of the study is devoted to examining the relevance and the role of international water 
law principles in governing the peace and security of sovereign states that share trans boundary 
water resources. The inter-link between the principles of international water law and hydro-
hegemony will be explored. The main justifications for encompassing these international water law 
discussions in this part of the study are manifold. First, most of these principles are employed 
widely in this study providing the reader with the clues and a better understanding about these 
international water law-governing principles. Second, when the thesis addresses its main research 
question in the fourth chapter, these principles are used by the contesting states (particularly, 
Ethiopia and Egypt) to assert their water share rights. Lastly, but not least demystification of the 
correlations between international water laws and the frame work of hydro-hegemony will enable 
the reader to brainstorm to what extent international water law is employed for achieving peace and 
security among trans boundary nations by supporting its soft laws and in augmenting the bargaining 
power of the weaker trans boundary states’ claims. In other words, to what extent the international 
water law principles are clear and defined to apply in trans boundary water resource disputes among 
nations and preventing the feasible disputes among states that share international rivers and manage 
hydro-hegemony scenarios. 
Before proceeding with international water law, it is mandatory to explain the main principles and 
sources of the public international law to elaborate how international water law works in the global 
domain. According to Shaw, general international law could be defined as “a system of principles 
and rules of general application governing the conduct and relations of states”70.	  International law 
governs states’ and international organizations’ actions or omissions of their date-to-date 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68)Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman, “Principles of international water law: creating effective transboundary water 
resources management," International Journal of Sustainable Society 1, no. 3 (2009), 208. 
69) Rahaman (2009), 208. 
70) Malcolm N. Shaw, International law (5thed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2. 
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interactions.71 In addition, the maintenance of peace and security by accommodating the interests of 
the contemporary international life has been the primary objective of international law. Its scope 
also ranges from the “the regulation of space expeditions to the question of the division of the ocean 
floor, and from the protection of human rights to the management of international financial 
system”72. From this we can infer that international law encompasses the regulation of trans 
boundary rivers water use state practices under its auspices. 
The difference between international law and domestic law lies on their legal subjects: the subjects 
of international law are the states while in the case of domestic laws- it is individuals. Additionally, 
their discrepancy extends to their governing bodies of which the laws are enacted, entertained and 
executed. There is no single body responsible for enacting, interpreting and executing the laws in 
the case of international law while domestic laws have their own well organized legislature, 
judiciary and the executive structures in the sovereign states. Hence, it is arduous to identify the 
laws in the case of international law when there is clash of competing sovereign states´ interests and 
this aggravates the confusion. However, it is fully ascertainable that the existence of international 
law and its “sources”.73	   
The UNs’ quasi-judicial body the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was established 
in 1921 at The Hague and succeeded by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1946. As an 
authoritative statement, Article 38(1) of the Statute of this UN organ stipulates the source of 
international law the court could apply in entertaining cases as: 
   “(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations;(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.”74 
Thus, the source of international law incorporates the rules that have long been developed and 
emerged through the interstate relations and practices. Until recently, the rules of customary –or 
unwritten –law have been the widely used source of international law. This law emerged from the 
practices of states particularly when there is an absence of formal and written agreements amongst 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71) Shaw (2003), 43. 
72) Shaw (2003), 43. 
73) Shaw (2003), 66. 
74) Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's modern introduction to international law (Routledge, 2002), 35. 
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themselves. These types of state practices become a binding customary law; there must be a 
“demonstrable general and widespread practice that shows that the states consider this rule 
governing their activities in particular” 75. As will be elaborated in the upcoming sections, the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of water resources as international water law was 
initially developed as rules of customary international law. International customary laws are 
characterized by imprecision and mostly open to conflicting interpretations. Owing to this absurdity, 
international customary laws are inadequate to address the increasing advanced and multifaceted 
cases that are widespread in today’s state interactions.76 
Over the last half-century, the codification and the development of international customary rules 
have become a priori actions taken by the states and the international community in general. Today, 
state rights and obligations are more defined by international treaties than international customary 
laws. International treaty incorporates also international convention, agreement, protocol, charter, 
accord and statute, binding state parties. 77 Relatively speaking, international treaties have many 
merits over customary rules in terms of clarity, precision, accessibility and their ability to deal with 
cases of highly technical character. As an international rule, a state is bound to a treaty that 
expressed its consent. Depending on the number of parties involved treaties may be bilateral 
(between two state parties), multilateral (more than two state parties) with limited participation 
(open for signature by a restricted number of countries), and universal (open for participation by all 
states). The other point worth mentioning here is the international law tenet called pacta sunt 
servanda, which is part of both international customary law and the UNs Charter and this principle 
requires every nation to be abide by the agreements they make. Its moral origin is sprung from the 
precept that international agreements are binding and must be performed in good faith. All disputes 
concerning the implementation, interpretation, or breach of an agreement must be resolved 
peacefully through a range of dispute settlement mechanisms available to states, both diplomatic 
(negotiation, mediation, fact-finding and inquiry, conciliation, etc.) and legal (adjudication and 
arbitration).78  
 Moreover, where there is a legal void, customary rules and treaties are insufficient, general 
principles of law could be employed as another source of international law to determine the 
respective rights and obligations of states. The origin of general principles of law is the national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75) Sergei Vinogradov, Patricia Wouters, and Patricia Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into Cooperation 
Potential: the role of international water law, (UNESCO (2003)), 9. 
76) Vinogradov et al. (2003), 10. 
77) Ian Brownlie, Public international law, (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2003), 11-13; Malanczuk (2002), 36-38.	  
78) Vinogradov et al. (2003), 11. 
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practice of the majority of legal systems across the globe and they encompass rules that are 
accepted by all, such as the prohibition of slavery and the principle of good faith. The decision of 
international courts and arbitral tribunals, and legal doctrines (the teachings of the “most highly 
qualified publicists” of various nations) are also used to determine the applicable rules of law and 
they are recognized as “subsidiary” sources of international law.79  
Under international law, in order to adjudge a state is responsible for breaching a law, two 
yardsticks should be cumulatively met. There must be an action or omission attributable to the state 
and simultaneously that particular conduct must be an identified violation of one of recognizable 
international laws reiterated above.  
Finally, International treaties also play a crucial role in regulating state controversies and 
interactions sharing trans boundary rivers under its other branch of legal system as will be discussed 
in detail in the upcoming sections.  
2-2) International Water Law  
International water law (that is also known as-international watercourse law or international law of 
water resource) is a branch of public international law that deals with the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourse. In other words, the term refers to the legal rules that regulate the use of 
water resources shared by two or more nations.80 The prime objective of international water law is: 
 “… to determine a state’s entitlement to the benefits of the watercourse (substantive rules) 
and to establish certain requirements for states’ behavior while developing the resource 
(procedural rules)”.81  
As an integral part of public international law, the basic tenets and concepts of international law 
such as the sovereign equality of states, non-interference in matters of exclusive national 
jurisdiction, responsibility for the breach of state’s international obligations, and peaceful settlement 
of international disputes, equally operates and extends to international waters law as well. 82 The 
fundamental principles amenable to international water law are: “equitable and reasonable 
utilization” of water resources located in the territory of the state, and a correlative duty to ensure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79) Malanczuk (2002), 50-53. 
80) Julio Barberis, “International Rivers,” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law ed. R.Bernhardt (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1986), 212.); Richard Paisley, “Adversaries into Partnerships: International Water Law and the 
Equitable Sharing of Downstream Benefits," Melbourne Journal of International Law 3 (2002), 281. 
81) Vinogradov et al. (2003), 12. 
82) Vinogradov et al. (2003), 12. 
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similar rights are enjoyed by co-basin states also known as the principle of causing  “no harm” to 
other riparians.83  
Similar to public international law, customary law is the primary source of international water law. 
The two basic pillar precepts of customary international water law that grants rights and impose 
duties on trans boundary states are: the right to use communal water resource in an “equitable and 
reasonable” manner, and to avoid causing significant harm to other riparian states. Since 1911 an 
attempt to incorporate these principles by the Institute of International Law (IDI) (an authoritative 
professional organization of international lawyers), could not have been realized. However, the 
codification of these keystone principles were incorporated under Article IV of the Helsinki Rules 
on the Uses of the Waters of International River of 1966 by the International Law Association 
(ILA), which is a professional non-governmental organization created in 1873 for the purpose of 
“study, elucidation and advancement of international law.” 84 
Treaties made between trans boundary states are also the primary source of international water law 
and they play a pivotal role in creating cooperation and peaceful co-existence amongst the sharing 
states. Hence, more than 3,600 international, multilateral and bilateral accords have been made 
underlining the use of water resources. The first general treaty dealing with international 
watercourses was the 1923 Geneva Convention that incorporates ideas in connection with the 
Development of Hydraulic Power affecting more than one state. The treaty failed, however, since 
only ten states without common borders ratified the agreement. 85 
Currently, there are a large number of multilateral - regional and basin-wide – agreements, the most 
significant being the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (1997 UN IWC Convention). There are also a multitude of bilateral 
agreements in the allocation of the shared water resources. 86 The 1959 agreement concluded 
between Egypt and Sudan to share the Nile water resource could be mentioned as an instance here. 
This thesis will address the details of these types of treaties made on the Nile River under its third 
chapter. 
 International judicial decisions made by the international Court of Justice (ICJ) took another 
platform in the interpretation and augmentation of the international customary water laws. The ICJ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83) Vinogradov et al. (2003), 12. 
84) Vinogradov et al. (2003), 12. 
85) Vinogradov et al. (2003), 13. 
86) Joseph W. Dellapenna, "Rivers as Legal Structures: The Examples of the Jordan and the Nile," Natural Resources 
Journal 36 (1996), 231.	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entertained a number of cases arising from trans boundary water resource disputes and rendered 
decisions. In the case of river Meuse, the Netherlands and Belgium submitted their dispute to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1930s over the diversion of the flow of water 
from their trans boundary river (Meuse). In this case, the court mainly pondered on providing the 
interpretation of their preexisted bilateral water share accord and diversion agreement. Most water 
scholars referred to the limited roles of this decision in the evolution of water laws but underlined 
the concurrence of the two parties to take their cases to the Court. By itself this was a significant 
step in an attempt to resolve water related disputes by international tribunals.87 In connection with 
this study, this case provides a clue that there are still international settlement mechanisms in case 
of disputes on trans boundary water resource share claims arising between Nile basin states.  
  2-3) Fundamental Principles of International Water Law  
In this section, the study expounds the competing principles of international water law before and 
after the development of the equitable utilization of water resources principles in 1960s. Sovereign 
states including the Eastern Nile Basin countries have been citing these principles to validate and 
assert their utilization of the shared water resource of the Nile.  
First, the Harmon Doctrine or the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty was named after the 
Attorney General Judson Harmon of the United States of America who reflected this idea on the use 
of shared water resources on the Rio Grande River after a dispute arose between the United States 
of America and Mexico. According to this precept, “a state has the right to use the fluvial waters 
which lie within its territory without any limitation whatsoever, regardless of the effects of this 
utilization on other states”. 88 Hence, the repercussions due to the use of the river water by the 
upstream state in the lower riparian countries, is a matter often ignored or not taken under 
consideration by the upstream countries. Consequently, the amount of water the downstream 
countries could access from the trans boundary river is mostly to be allotted by the upstream 
countries upon their water needs. This doctrine has often been adhered by the upper riparian states 
as it guarantees full sovereignty over their territory and to utilize its resources as they think fit to 
their own interest regardless of the consequences of their acts on other co-riparians. In the Indus 
river dispute between India and Pakistan, the upstream country India adopted this principle against 
downstream country-Pakistan.89 
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Moreover, the upper riparian countries usually try to employ this principle in order to affirm and 
practice their hydropower advantageous positions particularly to justify their tactics such as 
“diversion, overuse, contamination and flow delay of the shared water resource”90. This principle 
was rampant particularly before the emergence of other international water law principles and states 
were entitled to use their resources without any kind of legal restrictions. However, with the advent 
of international water law this principle began to be criticized and discredited by international 
tribunals and writings of experts in water field as it contradicts with one of the cornerstone of 
international law tenet (I.e., proscription of riparian states from causing harm to other states). As a 
result, states including the author of this principle-the USA, banned this theory.91  
 
Second, the principle of “absolute territorial integrity or the principle of prior appropriation” that 
bases its assertion on   the waters of the international rivers must be allowed to flow downstream 
substantially unchanged in quality and undiminished in quantity. In other words, no state may 
utilize the waters of a trans boundary river in a way that might cause any detrimental effect on other 
co-riparian territory. In other words, the lower riparian of an international river has the right to a full 
flow of water with natural quality and any interference with the natural flow by the upstream state 
require the consent of the downstream riparian. 92 The principle is more interlinked to the prior 
appropriation of water resources according to which the pre-existing water rights of the lower 
riparian countries entitlements should be protected and fulfilled prior to accommodating new water 
share interests of other riparians. Downstream countries favor this dogma as it grants them a veto 
power over any major utilization of water by upstream states. Currently, there are instances where 
the Egyptian government attempts to justify to secure their preexisted water share on the Blue Nile 
by advocating this doctrine and reciting the 1925 and 1959 agreements against the Nile 
Commission and Ethiopia’s GERD construction (as this paper will entertain it in detail on its 
upcoming chapters). In the 1940s and 1950s in relation to the Indus River dispute, Pakistan invoked 
the principle of prior appropriation against India to assert her water share claim while India 
employed the Hermon doctrine.  93  
According to Salaman, this principle imposes a duty on the upstream countries and does not tolerate 
slight uses of the shared water by the upstream countries. He further noted that this principle is the 
exact opposite of the Hermon Doctrine as it benefits the downstream countries solely. Owing to 
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those reasons, this principle has also been criticized and failed to become part of customary 
international water law as it has a limited state practice and jurisprudence adherences.94  
Third, intermediate theories developed as a result of the polar position of the above tenets. In other 
words, the Harmon Doctrine and the theory of absolute territorial integrity represent two extreme 
positions of water share principles that incline completely to the benefits of either the downstream 
or upstream states. It was the irrationality of these doctrines that directed the development of a more 
accommodative and mitigating water principles called the theory of Condominium or common 
jurisdiction and the limited sovereignty principles or theory of sovereign equality and territorial 
integrity-together called intermediate theories.95  
 
Theory of condominium or common jurisdiction that presupposes the recognition of International 
River as community property of all riparian states under international water law. The main source 
of this principle is considering the entire river basin as one economic unit and “rights over the 
waters of the entire river are vested in the collective body of the riparian states, or divided among 
them either by agreement or on the basis of proportionality”96. Its main objective is limiting a 
state’s freedom of action over the utilization of international rivers by requiring a state to get a prior 
consent from other stream countries for all types of projects involving the utilization of the trans 
boundary river by taking the rights of the river as a collective body.97Salman argues this principle 
did not gain a vast backing from the state practices as it compels the riparian states to enter into an 
agreement by compromising their sovereignty and nationalism that in turn undermines their 
competing demands of their water resource interests. 98 As a result, the principle of limited 
territorial sovereignty that is based on the equality of all riparian countries with regard to using the 
shared water resource survives. 
The “theory of sovereign equality and territorial integrity” pursuant to this theory, 
  “…. every state is free to use shared rivers flowing on its territory as long as such 
utilization does not prejudice the rights and interests of the co-riparians. In this case, 
sovereignty over shared water is relative and qualified. The co-riparians have reciprocal 
rights and duties in the utilization of the waters of their international watercourse and each 
is entitled to an equitable share of its benefits.” 99  
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That is to say, this principle entitles every riparian country equal rights to use the international 
waters. This right to use is not an absolute right.  It also bears a duty on every riparian state to 
confirm their utilization is not causing harm to other co-riparian states. 100The merits of this theory 
is that it encompasses the rights and interests of both the upstream and downstream countries in a 
way by limiting the use of water resource by upstream countries equitably and reasonably without 
hampering the equitable access rights of the downstream countries. Principles of equitable and 
reasonable utilization and obligation not to cause significant harm are part of the theory of limited 
territorial sovereignty. This theory has gained worldwide acceptance and formed the basis of 
modern international water law. 101 
Primarily, the principle of “equitable and reasonable utilization” underlies the “reasonable and 
equitable” use of trans boundary rivers by the states in their territory. According to scholars in the 
field, the permits of the use of water under this principle is to limit utilization so as it does not cause 
harm to other co-riparian states. This tenet has a wider support from the international water law 
legal system as it could be easily inferred from the water treaties both bilateral and multi-lateral, 
judicial decisions, academics, and other international bodies.102 Though the Helsinki Rules are not 
formal legal binding documents per se, they serve to manifest as guidelines for the state practice of 
water utilization worldwide. Article V states the criterions to be taken into consideration to 
determine the states’ utilization of an international river is reasonable and equitable as: 
    “ (a) the geography of the basin, including in particular, the extent of the drainage area 
in the territory of each basin state; (b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular 
the contribution of water by each basin state; (c) the climate affecting the basin; (d) the past 
utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular, existing utilization; (e) the 
economic and social needs of each basin state; (f) the population dependent on the waters of 
the basin in each basin state; (g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the 
economic and social needs of each basin state; (h) the availability of other resources; (i) the 
avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin; (j) the 
practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin states as a means of adjusting 
conflicts among uses; and (k) the degree to which the needs of a basin state may be satisfied, 
without causing substantial injury to a co-basin state” 103   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100) Salman (2007), 628.	  
101) Salman (2007), 628. 
102) Kliot (2005), 5. 
103) International Law Association, (Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers), Helsinki Rules on the 
uses of the waters of international rivers (International Law Association), 1967. 
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Likewise, the UNs Watercourse Convention under its Article 6 Sub-Article (1) prescribes the 
equal and reasonable utilization of international rivers and Article 5 of this Convention also lists 
circumstances that should be taken into account to evaluate whether the utilization of the water 
resource by a certain state is equitable and reasonable or not, in the following manner: 
(a) geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a 
natural character; (b) the social and economic needs of the watercourse states concerned; 
(c) the population dependent on the watercourse in the watercourse state; (d) the effects of 
the use or uses of the watercourse in one watercourse state on other watercourse states; (e) 
existing and potential uses of the watercourse; (f) conservation, protection, development and 
economy of the water resources of the watercourse and the cost of measures taken to that 
effect; and (g) the availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned 
or existing use.104	   
The factors mentioned under the Helsinki Rule and the UNs’ Watercourse Convention provisions 
are alike in determining whether state water utilization is reasonable and equitable or not. Weighing 
of these factors on the economic and social needs of co-riparian states is identified as reasonable 
and equitable by granting the maximum benefits for each riparian country. This doesn’t mean that 
the damages a state could incur or prevent could completely be curbed by the applications of these 
principles but it will play a crucial role in diminishing it. 105 
The principle of “duty not to cause significant harm” is another basic international water law 
principle that imposes an obligation on states not to cause significant harm. This principle is not 
treated separately under the Helsinki Rule but the duty is encompassed as part of the criterion in the 
equitable and reasonable utilization factors that specify the prohibition of the injury that may result 
from the use of the river by one riparian as one of the factors for determining equitable utilization. 
106  
Under the UNs Watercourse Convention, this principle commends states to take all appropriate 
measures to inhibit a significant harm to other co-riparian sates. Under Article 7 of the convention, 
states obligated not to cause significant harm to others. The new language of Article 7 expounds the 
state that causes significant harm to take measures to eliminate or mitigate such harm “having due 
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regard to Articles 5 and 6”.107 From the perspective of the state practices, lower riparians are more 
inclined to favor the no harm rule, as it protects existing uses against impacts resulting from 
activities undertaken by upstream states. Conversely, upper riparian states adhere to the equitable 
and reasonable utilization principle, because it grants more scope for states to utilize their share of 
the watercourse for activities that may impact on downstream states. 108 
However, in both the UN Convention and the Helsinki rules, the duty not to cause harm principle is 
taken as ancillary to the precept of equitable and reasonable utilization. This conclusive argument 
derived from Articles of 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention. Article 6 enumerates a number of factors for 
determining reasonable and equitable utilization. Those factors include: (i) “the effects of the use or 
uses of the watercourse in one watercourse State on other watercourse States”, and (ii) “existing and 
potential uses of the watercourse”. Those same factors will also need to be used, with other factors, 
to determine whether significant harm is caused to another riparian.  
Article 7(1) obliges states, when utilizing an international watercourse in their territory, to take all 
appropriate measures to prevent causing significant harm to other states. Nevertheless, when 
significant harm is caused to another watercourse state, Article 7(2) of the requires the state causing 
the harm to “take all appropriate measures, having due regard to Articles 5 and 6, in consultation 
with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm, and where appropriate, to discuss the 
question of compensation”. 109  
The other core point worth mentioning in international water share law is the concept of the duty of 
cooperation. This principle originates from the community of interest principles of riparian 
countries. The meaning of this precept and its implementation at the international sphere is open to 
controversy. It plays an important role in an obligation to share information, consultation and 
negotiation among the riparians on water project developments on international rivers. This 
promotes the cooperation of the riparian states in implementing the long-term, systematic planning 
of the utilization of the shared water resource that in turn paves the way to protect the ecology of 
the river and realize the sustainable use of the international watercourse.  
  2-4) International Water Laws and Framework of Hydro-hegemony 
Public international law regulates the utilization of freshwater by imposing some duties on a state 
towards its riparian neighbors through ‘soft laws’, non-binding and without the need of executive 	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organs in case of breach. Because contesting states interests and the scarcity of the water resource, 
it has been arduous to draft an internationally recognized binding convention governing 
international waters. Though that is the case till recently, the international community could manage 
in making core international customary water laws as we have elaborated it above. Unlike the 
binding treaties of international law to a certain states that signed the agreements, the customary 
international water laws applicability is wider and includes all states.  
The bedrock tenets of international water law hold the right to use equitable and reasonable 
utilization, the obligation not to cause harm on the other co-riparian and the procedural duties like 
the obligation to cooperate with other states in providing the appropriate information and 
notification about project developments on the shared water resource. These fundamental principles 
are included in many water related international treaties, documents and agreements including the 
Helsinki Rules of water resource and the UNs Watercourse Convention.  
Development of the concept of ‘counter-hegemony’ to describe the work of non-hegemonic states 
in their resistance against hegemonic control of water resources in international rivers is so crucial. 
Various studies suggest that soft forms of power are particularly, useful tool for non-hegemons. 
International law as a soft law will grant soft power for non-hegemons and this is the main indicator 
of the inter-link between international law and questions of hydro-hegemony. 110  
Cascão and Zeitoun (2010) divided the hydro-hegemony powers into four categories as stipulated in 
the previous chapter.  First, geographic or location power. Second, the most discernible form of 
power called ‘hard’ power that is mainly related to the material power of economic, technological 
and military capacity of the trans boundary states. Third, bargaining power, which concerns the 
ability to control the “rules of the game”, influencing the agenda, determining what is and is not on 
the negotiation table. State appeals to the international law in general are mostly categorized as this 
type of power dimensions. Legal principles governing trans boundary watercourse access are a 
source of bargaining power for states in the sense that they provide a body of rules reflecting broad 
consensus that states can appeal in relation to their conduct to the international legal system. Fourth, 
the ideational power is the ability “to create, uphold and destroy narratives, perceptions and 
knowledge”. As a repository and creator of ideas, it is a device and actor in ideational power. As an 
author of international ‘rules’, it is a tool and actor in bargaining power as well. Thus, international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110) Cascão and Zeitoun (2010), 34. 
	   33	  
law exerts notable soft power – and thus influences hydro-hegemonic relations – even when it does 
not carry with it a strong global police force with hard power.111  
The Framework of Hydro-hegemony is developing as an increasingly cogent argument for 
describing, analyzing and demonstrating state practice over trans boundary water issues, which 
determines to a significant degree by the use of power. The international legal system at present 
appears to be ‘blind’ to such causes of skewed water sharing arrangements and focuses instead upon 
realizing a remedy to its effects. 112 International law is effectively weakened when one state 
dominates another and particularly when treaty law is seen as the only legal means to achieve 
reasonable and equitable utilization of a shared water resource. The development and practice of 
treaty provisions for water sharing are certainly modified by the hegemonic behavior of a powerful 
state. It appears that, for the ‘carrot’ of international law to be attractive, the ‘stick’ of hegemony 
has first to be removed. Hegemony clearly diminishes the effectiveness of international legal 
principles. 113 
To conclude, the framework of hydro-hegemony may have a fairly specific field of applicability 
with respect to international watercourse law. This concept arises from a simple ‘three case’ model 
in which properly consenting states will ‘self-execute’ treaty provisions and achieve reasonable and 
equitable utilization of water, whereas unreasonable states will resort to conflict to capture a share 
of water. Between those two extremes lies a ‘lacuna’ for the law, yet much of the world’s 
inequitable sharing of water may be practiced in that grey area. To date, the law on shared waters 
has been largely defined by these ‘extreme situations’. By describing and analyzing state practice in 
this grey area, it may be possible to identify new and more effective regimes of legal responsibility 
and remedy, and address the most likely scenarios where inequitable water sharing is found.  This 
approach will also be employed to address the disputes and cooperation of the Eastern Nile Basin 
nations. The GERD is the result of Ethiopia’s continued contestation of Egypt´s hydro hegemony 
through the international legal domain (claiming equitable share of the Nile River), which is the 
strongest one to confront the status quo of Egypt’s hydro hegemony as per to Cascão (2009).114 In 
this case, Ethiopia is insisting on her position that the dam will not cause any significant harm on 	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the downstream countries by citing her right to equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile 
while Egypt is attempting to secure her historical treaty based right of the water share on the Nile. 
This thesis will explain it under its fourth chapter the palatability of water laws in strengthening 
their ideational and bargaining powers of these states by averring on the international customary 
laws.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
3) HYDRO-POWER RELATIONS IN THE EASTERN NILE: HISTORICAL, POLITICAL 
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES  
  3-1) General Historical and Political Discussion on the Nile Basin  
One of the crucial techniques to understand the current hydro hegemonic nature of the basin is 
discussing on the previous periods of historical, legal and political relations among those nations. 
The Nile Basin system that covers the Northeastern and part of Central Africa incorporates not only 
countries that have diversified hydrology, climate, and geography, but their heterogeneity also 
extends to political, historical and economic backgrounds. Scholars attempt to interlink these 
differentiations with the extreme asymmetrical power relations of these nations especially in the 
utilization of the river Nile water resource. This chapter will go through the historical, political, 
legal and future utilization prospects of the Nile to clarify the asymmetrical power positions 
persisted in the region. Additionally, it serves as a stepping-stone for the detailed discussions of the 
hydro-hegemony and counter-hydro hegemony contestations among the Eastern Nile Basin 
countries regarding the GERD. 115  
In the Middle East and North Africa, the management of water has been the core issue for the 
development of the human society over the ages. This is affirmed by the legal documents that 
govern the ancient Mesopotamia-called the Code of Ur-Nammu (ca. 2100 BCE) and the Code of 
Hammurabi (ca. 1750 BCE) and imposed a duty on the respective society to utilize and preserve the 
common water works and resources.116  For centuries, the people of Egypt and Sudan also have 
been dependent on the Nile as their sole water resource. Additionally, none of these courtiers in the 
region catch up with Egypt in terms of the highly developed irrigation system and relatively proper 
utilization of water resource of the river. The Nile was even the crucial water source for Egypt 
during the Arabs, Turkish Mamelukes, and Ottoman Turks conquests of 641,1250 and 1517, 
respectively.117 These conquerors contributed a lot to improve the irrigation system in Egypt, 
 “...it was the Arabs that made improvements in the irrigation practices with new types of 
water-lifting devices, building embankments and canals, and monitoring the Nile flow with 
about 20 Nilometers (devices that allowed them to measure river levels, compare flow over 
years and predict the oncoming floods). While the Mamelukes were warriors with periods of 
fighting, they were also builders, as evidenced by several beautiful mosques in Cairo” 118  	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During the colonial period from early 1700s till the 1800s, Europeans were eager to locate the 
source of the Nile as well as, mapping, measuring, clearing canals for navigation in the Sudd. 
Colonial powers had a keen interest in mechanized cotton and sugar cane plantations in the region. 
The United Kingdom conquered Kenya and Uganda and entered a number of legal water 
agreements to secure and protect their aspirations on the Nile River in Egypt and Sudan. 119  British 
control over the river continued until other European colonial powers such as Italy and France 
emerged in the region at the beginning of the 20th century. 120  This alerted the British to ensure 
their interest over the river through negotiations and agreements with different parties. 
 
 3-2) Legal Agreements on the Nile River during the Colonial Period 
Ethiopia was the only independent nation in Africa in the 1890s excluding her, the colonial powers 
of Great Britain and Germany made a treaty in 1890 that assigned the full control of the Nile to 
British influence. Following that year, Great Britain also signed a protocol with Eritrea’s colonizer 
Italy that also imposed a duty on the latter not to build any irrigation scheme that might have a 
significant effect on the empties of the Atbara River into the Nile River. Great Britain expanded her 
sphere of influence in the region by controlling Sudan in 1898. Cotton became the main agricultural 
crop produced in the region and exported to the British textile mills.121    
A protocol was also signed between Italy and Great Britain on April 15, 1891 the main aim of 
which was the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Africa. In this treaty 
only provision III refers to the Nile in a way that the “Government of Italy undertakes not to 
construct on the Atbara any irrigation or other works which might effectively modify its flow into 
the Nile.”122 This gave the United Kingdom the permission to maintain full control over the Tekeze 
(Atbara) river.123  
 
On May 15, 1902 an agreement was signed between Ethiopia and Great Britain and the main aim of 
this agreement was defining the border between Ethiopia and Sudan, the latter was under the British 
colony. However, Article III of this agreement stipulates about the use of the river Nile. This 
specific provision has mistranslated issues between its English and Amharic version. The English 
version of the treaty reads "His Majesty the Emperor Menilik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages 
himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be 	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constructed any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of 
their waters except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of 
Sudan". While the Amharic version, ‘arrest’ had been translated into ‘stop’. In other words, so long 
as Menilek did not stop the flow of the waters of the river completely, the agreement could not 
prevent him from utilizing and diverting Blue Nile water as per to the Amharic version. Some 
scholars recited this agreement as the most contentious Nile agreement in history and its effect on 
the diplomatic and political relations of the two nations was so pervasive and still persists today. 
This disagreement also extended to Ethio-Sudan hydro political relations according to which Sudan 
alleges that Ethiopia could not use the Nile river water without the permission of Sudan and this 
position was also backed by Egypt for protecting the latter’s water interest while Ethiopia 
renounced this agreement as void by querying its legitimacy and mistranslation of the Amharic vis-
à-vis the English version of the pact.124  
 
Another tripartite agreement entered among Britain, Italy and France in 1906 especially on its 
provision IV (a) states that these three colonial powers are committed: “to act together... to 
safeguard; ... the interests of Great Britain and Egypt in the Nile Basin, more especially as regards 
the regulation of the waters of that river and its tributaries (due consideration being paid to local 
interests) without prejudice to Italian interests”125. Hence, this agreement affirmed the non-
interference of the flow of the Nile tributaries such as Atbara, Blue Nile, and Sobat Rivers. In 
accordance with this protocol, the colonial powers of Italy and France ceded their water claim or 
interest entirely on the Basin in favor of Britain. Likewise, this agreement has also been rejected by 
Ethiopia as it violates its sovereign right. While the parties to the treaty acknowledged that almost 
all the tributaries of the Nile river originate from Ethiopia, Ethiopia was not a party to this 
agreement.126  
 
A formal agreement between independent Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was concluded on the 
7th of May 1929. This treaty awards an overwhelming water access rights for Egypt. The agreement 
also specifies Egypt’s acknowledgement of the allocation of more water rights for Sudan’s 
development saving that it did not “infringe Egypt's natural and historical rights in the waters of the 
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Nile and its requirements of agricultural extension” as per to the clear stipulation of the agreement. 
127 The main tenets of this agreement states: 
 “A) Egypt and Sudan utilize 48 and 4 billion cubic meters of the Nile flow per year, 
respectively. B) the flow of the Nile during January 20 to July 15 (dry season) would be 
reserved for Egypt. C) Egypt reserves the right to monitor the Nile flow in the upstream 
countries. D) Egypt assumed the right to undertake Nile river related projects without the 
consent of upper riparian states. And E) Egypt assumed the right to veto on any 
construction projects on the Nile that would affect her interests adversely”128  
 
The 1929 Agreement apportioned only the partial use of the Nile water and provided the established 
rights of the parties as 48 BCM for Egypt and 4 BCM for Sudan.129 In doing so, the United 
Kingdom recognized and assured the natural and historic rights as ‘‘acquired rights” to Egypt. None 
of the upstream nations were even mentioned or considered in this assertion of presumptive ‘rights’. 
In effect, this put severe restrictions on upstream countries’ water use. The agreement is mainly 
meant to be to secure and maintain the Nile water for Egypt by restricting the rights of Sudan and 
totally discarding those of the rest of upper riparians’ interests. None of the upstream states, 
including Ethiopia, were part of this agreement. After independence, all upper riparian states 
rejected this treaty.130 Egypt and Sudan considers it binding with reference to the principle of 
universal state succession principle till the present time. The upstream states refute this principle 
and vow to discard the agreement under the auspices of the “Nyerere Doctrine” of selective 
succession to treaties, arguing that international agreements dating back from colonial times should 
be renegotiated when a state becomes independent. The notion behind this doctrine is that any 
nation should not be bound by deals made while the state was not in its sovereign position. Despite 
this, the agreement guaranteed the foundation for Egypt’s hydro hegemony and opened a door for 
the acquired rights claims and absolute command of the Nile water resource management. Further it 
was exerted as a basis for the 1959 Nile water agreement.131  
 
After independence, Sudan sought modifications on the 1929 agreement by alleging that the 
agreement didn’t accommodate her rising water demand. Owing to the economic and technical 	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developments the country was experiencing during the 1950s, Sudan complained about the unfair 
allocation of the water resource. Due to this reason, Sudan officially repudiated the 1929 agreement, 
citing it as obsolesce and called for renegotiation in 1958. Consequently, a new agreement on the 
Full Utilization of the Nile waters was concluded in 1959 between the two nations. This agreement 
affirmed two nations as the only countries that have the right to utilize the Nile river water as one 
can infer it from the preamble of the agreement itself 132that states:  
     “Whereas the Nile Waters Agreement concluded in 1929 has only regulated a partial use 
of the natural river and did not cover the future conditions of a fully controlled water supply, 
the two Republics have agreed as follows.” 133  
The 1959 agreement provided no alternative basis and the detail agreements of this negotiation 
mainly incorporates that the quantity of the average annual Nile yield to be 84 BCM measured at 
Aswan High Dam, in Egypt. The average annual flow of the Nile to be partaken was agreed solely 
between Sudan and Egypt as 18.5 BCM and 55.5 BCM, respectively. The annual water loss due to 
evaporation and other factors were agreed to be about 10 BCM. This quantity would be deducted 
from the Nile annual yield before their share is apportioned to Egypt and Sudan. The two nations 
also agreed to adopt a unified view in any other negotiations concerning the Nile waters. The 
agreement manifestly declares that if any claim would come from other riparian countries over the 
Nile water resource, both the Sudan and Egypt shall, together, handle the claims to the extent that 
accommodating that claim by deducting from their own share apportioned as per this agreement. 
The agreement also permitted Egypt the right to construct the Aswan High Dam that can store the 
entire annual Nile River flow and it also granted Sudan the full right to construct the Rosaries Dam 
on the Blue Nile and, to develop other irrigation and hydroelectric power generation until the 
country fully utilizes its Nile share quota. Moreover, the agreement set up a dual Permanent Joint 
Technical Commission in order to secure the technical cooperation between the two downstream 
countries.134  
This treaty armored the previous claims of  “natural and historical rights” to the Nile waters and the 
two nations have been recited it as a redline set aside for further negotiations. According to Brunnee 
(2002), the agreement deviates from the normal legal treaties in a way that the treaty was bilateral; 	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it allocates the entire flow of the Nile water to themselves (Egypt and Sudan) exclusively of the 
rights and interests of other riparian nations, conspicuously Ethiopian rights.135Nonetheless, upper 
riparian countries including the greatest contributor for the Nile flow (Ethiopia) were neither invited 
nor were party to the 1959 treaty. This is one of the main justifications for alleging that the treaty 
plays a crucial role in establishing Egypt’s negative or dominative hydro hegemony in the Nile 
basin system by securing Egypt’s water share interest and rejecting or non-cognizance of the water 
rights of other riparian countries. Owing to this reason, “the 1959 treaty left a legacy for potential 
conflict between Egypt and Sudan, on one side, and Ethiopia and the seven other riparian countries, 
on the other”.136 
Agreements made during the colonial period were not inclusive of the upper riparian countries’ 
water share interests. They were characterized by the validation of Egypt’s hydro hegemony in the 
region. The controversies that arose due to matters related to these treaties are irresolvable. The 
modern international water laws such as the 1997 United Nations Watercourses Convention could 
not settle the gaps created between upper and downstream countries to this date. Their 
contentiousness emanates from: 
“…Egypt says that all Nile basin countries must recognize the 1959 treaty before any new 
agreements are implemented, including benefit sharing proposals. …this claim has not been 
favored by the rest of the riparian countries. Several riparian nations, especially Ethiopia, 
criticized the treaty/ies by stating that (i) they were not partaking to the 1929 and 1959 
treaties and (ii) these treaties violate their right to equitable utilization as stated in the 1997 
UN convention. The upstream countries with their own development issues do not feel that 
they need Egyptian permission to use Nile water.”137  
To conclude, Nile basin agreements before the 1959 were concluded either between/among colonial 
powers in the region or between Sudan and Egypt (downstream countries), none of the upper 
riparian countries were part of them. From an international law perspective those agreements are 
incomplete, contentious and fragmented treaty regimes. Most of the riparian countries either 
rejected them manifestly or have no clue about their very existence, as they are not party to them. 
The ceaseless aspirations of the implementation of these agreements, especially the 1959 agreement 
on the side of Sudan and Egypt and their renunciation by the rest of the riparian countries, had 
repercussions on the regional integration in the Nile Basin. In other words, this circumstance has 	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magnified the gaps and disparities between the upper riparian countries and the lower riparian 
countries that in turn are an obstacle in the efforts to draw comprehensive binding agreements and 
build regional cooperation among those nations in the Nile basin. These agreements were 
historically descended and are the main causes for contemporary water disputes, between the upper 
and lower stream countries. However, in the post-colonial era efforts has been made efforts to unite 
the Nile basin countries through bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements.  
   3-3) Post-colonial Hydro-relations in the Eastern Nile Basin  
In 1983, the primary ingenuity in creating basin-wide cooperation proposal was taken by Egypt 
through launching an informal organization called  “Undugu”- Swahili word a meaning 
“brotherhood”. This organization reflected the alteration of the internal policies of Egypt towards 
the Nile water matters turning the paradigm more to cooperation and understanding. This informal 
organization comprises of Sudan, Uganda and Zaire (the current Democratic Republic of Congo) 
from the Nile riparian nations, Ethiopia and Kenya partook as an observer status and latter joined by 
Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania, and its non-stream member of the Central African Republic. The 
main goal of Undugu was to discuss annual ministerial meetings issues such as the Nile waters, 
agriculture and resource development, and the promotion of economic, technical, and scientific 
cooperation among the riparians saving that the actual individual Nile stream country’s 
participation might be distinctive form of this main objective.138 The role of Undugu in establishing 
an institutional locus for sharing of expertise and considering the Nile as synergic (a whole) is not 
less than the sum of national parts, was appraised by scholars in the field. Egypt continued to 
develop huge irrigation infrastructures unilaterally, widening its land reclamation projects without 
consulting other member states that directly deteriorated the cooperative initiative of the 
organization.139  
 
While most member states were interested in fostering “self-reliance and African inter-dependence,” 
through Undugu, Egypt was exploiting it as “an exercise in hegemonic influence” in the region by 
repeating British colonial ways of exerting authority. This situation created dissatisfaction among 
the other riparian nations and coupled with other factors such as Egypt’s financial and political 
problems facilitated the failure and parish of the Undugu to be a meaningful and concrete 
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cooperation organization in the Nile basin.140  
 
Ensuing the inoperativeness of the Undugu, Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire 
(DRC) with the partaking of the rest of other riparian countries as an observer founded the 
Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental 
Protection of the Nile (TECCONILE herein under) in 1992. When they inaugurated it for the first 
time, the organization was meant to be an interim scheme for a period of three years. The 
presumption was upon the expiry of this transitional period a permanent institution that 
encompasses the whole basin states would be formed. Its main objective was stipulated as: 
“TECCONILE aimed to contribute in the development of the Nile Basin in an integrated 
and sustainable manner through basin-wide cooperation and the determination of equitable 
sharing of its waters…to develop infrastructure, techniques and build capacity for the 
management of water resources and to formulate national master plans and integrate them 
into a Nile Basin Action Plan”141  
 
Initially Ethiopia and Kenya refused to join the institution considering it as a novel extension of 
Egyptian hydro hegemony in Undugu and non-incorporating of the fundamental issue of equitable 
utilization of water resource on the basin under its framework. TECCONILE became a subsidiary to 
Hydromet and persisted to be highly technical in its focus in lieu of hydro politics so as to 
discourage the full involvement of those countries that were on the observer status, especially 
Ethiopia.  
Nevertheless, by encompassing all basin states, the Nile River Action Plan was developed and 
adopted by the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs that met in Arusha, Tanzania, in February 
1995.Most of the provisions of this Action Plan were focused on elaboration of the establishment of 
a basin-wide, multidisciplinary framework for legal and institutional arrangements. But only few 
provisions of the plan were effectuated. Financial and other resource constraints and the 
contestation among the riparian nation to dominate in hydro hegemon on one another, were recited 
as two of the main justifications for its ineffectiveness. TECCONILE’s role in providing Nile-
related data and information, country capacity in technical monitoring by itself and through the 
2002 Nile Conferences were magnanimous. 142  
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The “2002 Nile Conferences” was also one of the informal meetings of the riparian nations that 
played a pertinent role in the cultivation of cooperation in the region. After its establishment in 
1993, the meeting was continued annually in various basin states till the 2002 assembly at which 
time they continued the Nile Basin Development Forum. The 2002 Nile Conferences were based on 
the theme of “comprehensive cooperation”. In spite of the fact that this conference was assumed to 
be technical in nature, the issues discussed often ranged into legal and normative topics. The merits 
of the informal nature of this meeting were to augment open discussions that would not have been 
done in a formal meeting and establishing trust through dialogue among the riparian nations. Taking 
into consideration the extensiveness of the Nile Basin and the competing interests and tensions 
among the riparian countries, this series of meetings created conducive environment for the 
establishment of sub-regional discussion forums within the Basin system so as to realize and 
effectuate cooperation widely in the region. 143With the end of its period of implementation, the 
need to substitute TECCONILE was crucial and the water ministers of nine of the ten Nile riparian 
countries (Eritrea partaking as an observer) agreed to establish a new institution called the Nile 
Basin Initiative in February 1999.  
The core objectives of the NBI were  'to develop the river in a cooperative manner, share substantial 
socio-economic benefits and promote regional peace and security' 144 .The NBI epitomizes a 
landmark in Nile water management by transforming the riparian states interaction from 
competition to cooperation. It played a crucial role in bringing almost all Nile basin countries for 
joint discussions and promotes regional partnership, economic development and poverty alleviation. 
Learning from the causes of the failures of previous institutions in the basin system, the resource 
scarcity, financial sources could be secured from the international donors such as the World Bank, 
United Nations Development Program (herein under UNDP), and Canadian International 
Development Agency (herein under CIDA).145 
NBI has been able to bring the riparian states on board for dialogue towards setting up plans for 
cooperative utilization and management of the water resources but also make an effort towards 
establishing a legal institutional framework. One of the objectives of the NBI was to negotiate on a 
Cooperative Frame of Agreement (herein under CFA) that succeeds the past bilateral treaties. In 
May 2010, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania signed a Cooperative Framework 
Agreement (CFA) and latter Burundi and the DRC followed suit. The main notion of the CFA 
overlies on the legal tenet of determining a reasonable and equitable solution for sharing Nile 	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waters among the basin states. Almost all members of the NBI agreed on the contents of the CFA 
except Article 14b of the instrument that incorporates the ambiguous phrase “water security”. This 
provision becomes a point of contention, Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the document and 
threatened to leave the NBI unless this phrase is substituted with “benefit sharing”. The matter of 
controversy could also be boil down to the previous established water rights vis-à-vis the future 
prospect of equal water sharing claims in the basin. In other words, upstream countries have insisted 
that this new framework must disregard all previous agreements to which they were not part and 
secure their equal water share while downstream countries seek a new framework that includes and 
acknowledges their previous water share rights.146 Nevertheless, the NBI has been influential in 
fostering the transfer of information on water resource sharing and initiating small projects. But in 
order to implement its pervasive Nile water projects, it requires to be a permanent river organization 
that in turn demands the ratification of a new Nile Treaty as agreed by all members. 147  
 
The future success of the NBI is contingent on the CFA. This appears to be impractical at least for 
the time being because of the polar positions between the downstream and upstream countries 
regarding water share claims. Governments involved assert their current positions with reference to 
old adages of previous agreements and arguments largely following the formula of where they stand 
depend on where they are situated along the river in maintaining the classic upstream–downstream 
controversy. This relapses at the end to the contesting position held by Egypt and Sudan on one side, 
and Ethiopia and other upper riparians on the other side. To connect it with the discussion of this 
study, the CFA disagreements are finally coiled up on the aspiration of securing Egypt’s hydro 
hegemony position in the basin and the incessant counter contestation of this power status quo by 
the upstream countries, particularly Ethiopia. 
 
 3-4) Future Water Demand and Hydro-relation Prospects in the Eastern Nile Basin 
Efforts have been underway to create cooperation among the Nile riparian countries through 
bilateral and multilateral agreements since the late 19th century. In this regard the 
1891,1899,1902,1906,1929 and 1959 agreements reflect the influences of colonial powers’ on the 
two downstream Eastern Nile countries’ interests in the region. Besides, other basin wide 
institutions have also been set up such as the Undugu, TECCONILE, 2002 Nile Conferences and 
Nile Basin Initiative. However, all the Nile riparian countries, particularly Egypt, Sudan and 
Ethiopia continue to view Nile water development programs predominantly from state-centric 
perspectives instead of regional basin based cooperation platform. These nations prefer to take their 	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own water development actions. Swain (2008) holds that this policy of unilateral water 
development is both unsustainable and conflict inducing. 148 Thus, to comprehend clearly the hydro 
relations of the region, studying the past hydro relations of those nations is not adequate but the 
current and future geopolitics and hydropower relations in the region have to be expounded as well. 
And the best approach is focusing on the country level positions towards the shared water resource.  
 
First in the case of Egypt, the country’s attachment with the Nile water resource is so strong and 
extends back to ancient times. Egypt has been utilizing the river and controlling the basin to a large 
extent whilst proclaiming her historic use rights to the River repeatedly. Egypt tried to justify her 
claims on the water resource from the viewpoint of her entire (sole) reliance on the Nile water for 
survival while other upstream countries have other alternative water sources such as better annual 
rainfall water. Consequently, the country is very sensitive about water diversions and water 
development projects in the upstream countries.149 
 
Second, Egypt is currently a country dependent on the Nile River for more than 95 percent of its 
total water consumption annually. Owing to her geographical proximity, Egypt receives 65.5 % of 
the 66 Cubic Idlometres per annum from the renewable surface water of the Nile basin. Still the 
country is one of the short listed nations that will face water strain or scarcity in the near feature.150 
Although Egypt is consuming almost the entire waters of the river, the country is still planning to 
extend the land reclamation projects in the Western Desert that in turn requires acquiring much 
more water from the Nile basin. Additionally, Egypt has built several irrigation projects such as the 
Isna Barrage, Nag Hammadi Barrage, Asyut Barrage, the Damietta and Rosetta Deltas, Zifta 
Barrage, Idfina Barrage and Damietta Dam in the river's downstream, which will certainly be 
affected by decreased flow from Aswan.151 
 
On the other preview, the population of Egypt will grow from 62.3 million in 1995 to 95.6 million 
by 2026 and will likely reach 114.8 million before it stabilizes in the year 2065 as stated in the 
projections of United Nations population growth report. Though Egypt is consuming most of the 
water of the Nile water for irrigation purposes, the country imports more than half of its food from 
external sources. Hence, to accommodate the future growing demand for food due to the increasing 
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number of her population the country needs more water, which will have an impact and further 
pressure on an already scarce water resource.152  
 
Following the culmination of colonialism in Africa, the emerging independent Nile Basin states 
have claimed the right to use their share of the Basin water resource for their own national 
development. This scenario coupled with the external location of the vital source of the Nile, made 
water the foremost strategic national security concern for Egypt. Egypt is concerned that any hydro-
electrical and irrigation dams would drain the Nile river water and could prevent it from reaching at 
the lower riparians. Resultantly, there will be a less water that will have repercussions on the 
growing economy and population. Recently, owing to so many factors that we will explicate in the 
coming chapter, the hydro political topography is changing in Eastern Nile nations in favor of the 
upstream countries so that the latter have transformed from prodding to take an action against 
Egypt’s water interests. Upstream countries demand for more water to cope with their growing 
populations and economies but this is seen by Egypt as a potential national security threat. This is 
the point of contention between Egypt and Ethiopia subsequent to the construction of GERD on the 
Nile Basin. Egypt has contested issues pertaining to the Nile as a matter of national security and 
exercises its hydro hegemonic power in the region to curb any kind of threat arising from the 
consumption of water resources.153 
 
Second, Sudan is one of the largest African countries and has a diverse climate that ranges from the 
rainforest areas of the south with the average rainfall of 1,600 mm to the dry north with the average 
annual rainfall of 25mm. The northern part of the country is completely contingent on irrigation-
based agriculture due to shortage of rainfall. Among the total 35 million population of the country 
more than 70 percent depends on agriculture.154  
Furthermore, the potential cultivable land Sudan owns is around 105 million hectares out of which 
only 16.7 million hectares is under use. Like other countries of the continent, the rapid growth of 
Sudan’s population growth is forecasted due to this fact the country demands more water and 
cultivate arable land to increase her food production in parallel. Additionally, the increased 
desertification and land degradation in the country is exacerbating the pre-existed Sudan’s water 
demand because Sudan is alleging that the country has utilized its share of the Nile water 
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apportioned as per to the previous agreements but still needs more water from the Nile. 155 
Accordingly, Sudan built a number of dams for the purpose of water storage, irrigation and 
regulating the high seasonal fluctuation of the river runoff. In this regard, the Aulia Dam on the 
White Nile, Roseires Dam and Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile, and Kashm el Girba Dam on the 
Atbara River are part of this water development project. Though it could not be practical till now 
due to the undergoing civil war in the country, the Jonglei Canal was originally designed to bypass 
the swamps from upstream of the Sudd to a point further down the White Nile so as to increase the 
availability of water at downstream countries.156  
 
Moreover, Sudan is planning to build a number of additional dams to achieve food security and 
accommodate the country’s increasing energy demand caused by economic development. Egypt 
supports Sudan’s decision and plans of agricultural and hydropower based diversion of the Nile 
water while it strongly opposes any of those kinds of activities of other upper riparian countries (in 
this aspect the water dispute and controversy between Ethiopia and Egypt on the GERD could be 
mentioned here). The extension of Egypt’s support to the Sudan stems from the benefit Sudanese 
dams provide in regulating siltation, stopping most of the sediment load before it reaches Lake 
Nasser and maintains the amount of water reaching to Egypt. Egypt expects that “hydropower can 
help Sudan to utilize its groundwater potential to meet the country's increasing water needs and 
ensure long-term smooth passage of Nile water to Lake Nasser” 157. 
 
With similar geographical location at the downstream of the Nile Basin, Sudan and Egypt are also 
the historical colonies of United Kingdom with strong political, religious, and historical linkages. 
Sudan used to follow the footsteps of Egypt in matters related to the Nile. Exception to this trend 
were the disagreement on the 1929 treaty which was latter replenished with the 1959 that grants 
Sudan 18.5 BCM of water and the disagreement on the construction of the GERD in which case 
Sudan supports the project while Egypt opposes it. Nevertheless, Sudan still recognizes the dual 
policy towards the Nile River (I.e., historical acquired rights and, principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization of the shared water resource) that clarifies the moderate approach Sudan is 
developing in the Nile basin unlike Egypt. In spite of the fact that the dominative negative hydro 
hegemony of Egypt is also extended to the Sudan (as one can infer it from the legal agreements and 
water based interactions of Sudan and Egypt).158  
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Third, Ethiopia contributes not only about 86 % of the total Nile flow but also more than 95 % of 
the silt in the main Nile river system. As a result, while soil erosion and land degradation are the 
problem in the upstream countries, siltation and water quality pollution are downstream 
complications. That is the main reason behind that cooperation among the upper and downstream 
countries is so demanding to keep the natural flow of the water at the Basin level. For instance, the 
problem of downstream siltation, which requires upstream solutions such as building debris or 
detention dams, illustrates the interdependence of basin states. Much of the threat to the quantity 
and quality of Nile waters comes from Ethiopia, which also faces environmental degradation from 
deforestation and population growth.159  
 
Ethiopia’s population growth is the rapidest in the entire Nile River Basin in general. Ethiopia’s 
current population 98.9 million is projected to reach 287 million in 2050. Agriculture is the main 
sector of Ethiopia’s economy that contributes 40 percent of the country’s Gross National Product 
(here in after GNP) and 90 percent of its export and employs 85 percent of the population. 88 
percent of the country’s population dwells in the highlands that comprise only 44 percent of the 
total land area of the country. Suffering from incessant and drastic famine, the growing population 
and increasing food imports to accommodate these problems, the country aspires to achieve food 
self-sufficiency at any cost. ”160   
 
However, while Ethiopia has approximately 2.3 million hectares of irrigable land in its part of the 
Nile Basin, of which only less than 1% has been developed. According to Swain; 
 “..given its needs for survival, and with the headwaters of the Nile being one of its few 
natural resources, Ethiopia is serious about maintaining more Nile water for its own use. 
Egypt has historically been concerned about Ethiopia's water development plans because 
the country's irrigation plans could substantially reduce the water flow in the Nile, 
constituting a major threat to Egypt's water supply.”161  
 
Ethiopia’s lack of other natural resources makes the country rely more on her water resource for 
food security. That has indirect repercussions on the country’s potential of the usage of alternative 
resources to import food so as to accommodate the demand. While Egypt opposes vehemently any 
water diversion by Ethiopia for irrigation purposes, there has been some flexibility regarding the 
development of hydropower in the Ethiopian highlands. This is mostly attributed to the hope that 	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these dams, as in Sudan, may help to arrest sedimentation. For some time, Egypt have been 
successful in employing her diplomatic strategy to curb any foreign investments and international 
financial support to Ethiopia’s large-scale irrigation plans in the Nile River.162 Pursuant to Arsano, 
most of Ethiopia’s water project plans are ineffective due to: 
“…. lack of sufficient financial resources of its own, and neither did it have readily 
available access to external finances to carry out water-resources development. The country 
also lacked the institutional capability for studying, planning and implementing projects. 
Ethiopia’s vulnerability to the upstream–downstream hydro political confrontations in the 
context of the Cold War complicated matters, as did the related and recurrent political 
upheavals.” 163 
 
Currently, Ethiopia is transforming her international image from a ‘silent partner’ to active role 
player in the Nile water politics. The country’s silent involvement on Nile matter was amenable to 
protracted internal conflicts and political instability, lack of financial sources, weak institutions, a 
lack of priority and strategy for the water sector, and an agricultural sector relying on rain water, 
reducing need for irrigation. However, recent political, social and economic stability in the country 
complemented by improved relations with donors is prioritizing the Nile issue in Ethiopia.164 
Recognizing this Ethiopia has been financing the cost of the GERD from the domestic sources. 
 
So, there are efforts amongst the Eastern Nile Basin nations to cooperate at the regional level by 
inaugurating regional water institutions such as NBI by the international funding agencies. In this 
regard, the World Bank projected the efficacy of the NBI in creating cooperation and minimizing 
tensions among the basin nations.  Each of these nations still holds their own individual ambitions, 
which do not necessarily assimilate with their counterparts. Hence, the state-centric perspective of 
the Nile water development still dominates the basin.165  
 
Countries like Ethiopia their active membership in the CFA has not deter them to take a unilateral 
hydraulic development projects in the absence of cooperation and a comprehensive agreement. The 
GERD could be mentioned as the best instance in this regard. According to Cascão (2009), the 
impacts of those kinds of upstream projects on the lower riparian nations might be arduous to assess, 
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however, their political implications are huge especially in culminating the historical monopoly and 
dominative hydro- hegemony of the lower riparian countries, particularly Egypt.166  
 
Furthermore, none of the Nile basin countries in general and the Eastern Nile Basin Nations in 
particular, has yet ratified international water laws such as the Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. As the thesis addressed in chapter two, these 
conventions plays a key role in establishing basin wide cooperation and protecting the ecosystem as 
well as assuring tenets such as equitable and reasonable manner, no- harm use and exchange of 
information rules. The lack of support for these tenets in the Eastern Nile Basin countries clarifies 
the prevalence and domination of an outdated school of thought in the Nile water management 
sector. The ambiguous principle “water security” in the CFA provision is also creating a serious 
stalemate, which threatens future cooperation among the Nile Basin countries. Failing to achieve 
the concurrence of all states particularly Egypt and Sudan, the CFA will not be in any way capable 
of addressing the water sharing issues of the Nile. Rather, it may be a major source of contention 
between upstream and downstream riparian countries.167  
 
To conclude this chapter, Ethiopia is gaining a greater water political role to play in the region that 
could be asserted by her active hydro-engagements. One of these instances is the role the country 
played as an instrument to convince the six equatorial Nile riparians to vote in favor of the draft 
CFA that validates the tenet called “equitable utilization” of water resources. This agreement also 
counters and modulates the past agreements and treaties that confer Egypt and Sudan historical and 
acquired rights. Ethiopia’s bargaining power is enhancing in the region and draws on good relations 
with the World Bank and the wider financial donor communities. Financial and investment support 
from foreign nations, notably China is improving from time to time. Nonetheless, Egypt’s 
bargaining power at the international level has been diminishing compared to the previous ages. 
These scenarios are dashing the feasibility of achieving basin-based water resource management in 
the near future, and at the same time have increased the possibilities of open dispute among the 
riparian countries. 168 
 
The rational behind the inefficiency of creating cooperation in the Nile Basin can be summarized: First, the 
efforts of the NBI in addressing the core point of contentions between the downstream and upstream riparian 
are insignificant. Secondly, the introduction of the concept of equivocal terminology -“water security” under 	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the CFA provisions made the gap wider in the interpretation of it between the upper and lower riparian 
countries. Third, the negotiation process in the NBI and CFA institutions lacks efficiency. Fourth, the 
construction of the GERD is at the moment serving as a cradle in changing the bellicose history debate 
and has profound effect on the interaction among these and other riparian states.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4) CONSTRUCTION OF GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENNAISSANCE DAM (GERD) ON THE 
NILE RIVER: CAUSE FOR COOPERATION OR CONFLICT AMONGST ETHIOPIA, 
EGYPT AND SUDAN  
 
 4-1) General Discussion about the GERD 
The pertinence of energy in today’s world is not only restricted to the provision of basic services 
such as lighting and power to energy end utilizations but access to energy is also reformulating the 
economic and social progress of nations. Transformation facets of countries are dependent on the 
availability, affordability and reliability of energy in general. In other words, energy access and 
security is a very determinant factor of evaluating the development and proper functioning of the 
present day societies as “social affairs, economic exchange, information sharing, provision of public 
services and the overall quality of life depend on the availability and reliability of the supply of 
energy”. 169  
 
Globally, more than 1.3 billion people don’t have access to electricity and 2.7 billion lack clean 
cooking facilities. These challenges are cumulated largely (95%) in Africa and developing Asia. In 
Eastern Africa, over 90% of the population are dependent on biomass energy, which is more than 
any other developing regions: Asia 54 %, Latin America 19% and the Middle East 0%.170 This 
report further expounds that the electricity access of each Eastern African countries have been 
assessed in the following manner: 
   “Electricity access rates range from 1% in the new State of South Sudan (leaving 9.3 
million people without access), 9% in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (nearly 60 
million without access) to 12% in Uganda (more than 27 million people without access), 
14% in Tanzania (nearly 38 million without access), 18% in Kenya (more than 32 million 
without access) and 22.5 % in Ethiopia (nearly 64.5 million without access).”171 
Hence, Africa, and particularly the Eastern Africa sub region labeled as the most significant 
challenge to address the global energy access problem though this sub region is endowed with well-
known rivers that have praiseworthy potentials for hydropower production and development. The 
hydropower potential of the Nile Basin countries combined amounts to roughly 140,000 MW and 
Ethiopia account for 45,000 MW of this total potential in the region.172 However, the energy sector 
in Ethiopia is underdeveloped and mainly relies on biomass energy. Energy supply and 	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consumption trends for the country have been reported in away that the share of biomass, petroleum 
fuels and electricity counts 91.3, 7.6 and 1.1 percent of the total energy use, respectively. 173 
Recognizing the underdevelopment of the country’s energy sector and taking into account of the 
key role energy could play in the country’s social and economic development, enhancing 
productivity in agricultural, industrial and social services, Ethiopia devised her first Energy Policy 
in 1994. One of the primary and vital directions of this policy is “expanding hydroelectric power 
based on national economic and social needs”.174  
 
To exploit these energy resources and to expand access domestically and enhance export potential, 
Ethiopia has embarked on an aggressive energy resource development path evidenced by the 
development of a series of hydroelectric projects. Among these projects was the commencement of 
a huge hydro electric dam at the Blue Nile at Guba Woreda (County) in Benshangul-Gumuz 
Regional State in April 2011 -known as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).  With an 
annual production capacity of 6,000MG, a storage reservoir capacity of 74 BCM, a height of 175 
Meters and length of 1.8 Kilometers, the  GERD is set to become the largest hydroelectric power 
plant in Africa. 175 The Ethiopian Government has alleged that the objective of the dam is not 
restricted to attaining electricity shortages domestically but generates surplus energy for export to 
neighboring countries to benefit the wider region and augment regional economic integration.  
 
As this study discussed in the previous chapters, the main feature of the regional geopolitics spills 
over into hydro politics. When Ethiopia initiated the GERD project the reactions from the two 
downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) was totally variegated in a way that Sudan avowed and 
reaffirmed its support for the GERD whilst Egypt vociferously opposed the project, by alleging the 
dam would infringe her historical water share rights.176  
 
From the historical point of view, Egypt strongly opposed any sort of water development projects 
on the Nile by the upriver countries outside of the previous agreements of the basin. Gebreluel 
explained that the issue of Nile for Egypt is not only a matter of economic benefits but also 
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symbolic and sentimental. In other words, apart from the geopolitics and securitization of the Nile 
river  
“..... holds a special and entrenched role in the history and identity of the nation. Ethiopians, 
too, see the river in a symbolic light: their incapacity thus far to utilize the Nile waters 
epitomizes the nation’s political and economic underdevelopment.” 177 
The connotation and the meaning of the name given to the Dam project (the GERD) or in Amharic 
“hedasie” emanates from this sentiment so as to refer to a leap out of the dark ages of 
underdevelopment and poverty. It indicates Ethiopia’s recent economic and political changes and 
contemporary revival undergoing in the country. For the leaders of both nations the dispute over the 
Nile is a political ordeal where one slight error might constitute domestic political suicide and loss 
of regional political leverages.178 Currently, the hydraulic historical controversies, the pressures of 
population growth, industrialization, and climate change are the main causes. Their impact on water 
quantity and quality of the river, on one side, and the construction of the GERD as an immediate 
cause, on the other side, aggravate the complications and the tensions of water politics in the 
region.179  
 
However, the three nations decided to absolve the deadlock through negotiation and diplomacy. 
Ethiopian government invited the two downstream countries of Sudan and Egypt to inaugurate 
International Panel of Experts (herein under IPoE) on the GERD. This panel also incorporates two 
national expert representatives from each of the three nations. The main objective of the IPoE is to 
“review the design documents of the GERD, provide transparent information sharing and to solicit 
understanding of the benefits and costs accrued to the three countries and impacts if any of the 
GERD on the two downstream countries so as to build trust and confidence among all parties” 180. 
Upon presenting its final report, the Panel concluded that the GERD fulfills the international dam 
construction standards and its effect on the downstream countries is not significant. In addition, the 
panel also gave its recommendation on some core issues like the dam safety and the need to conduct 
further hydropower modeling in the Eastern Nile Basin and to undertake further downstream socio-
economic impact assessments of the dam.181 
 
However, dealing to settle their differences amicably did not persist for that long. The tapping of 
the Nile River water by Ethiopia for the GERD purpose in 2013 escalated the tensions between 
Egypt and Ethiopia again. Egypt has even resorted to threatening to use military force targeting 	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strikes on the GERD reservoir.182 In a political discussion meeting without cognizance of they were 
live on TV broadcast, Egyptian politician leaders proposed to former President Morsi that Egypt 
should either conduct a military attack on Ethiopia and her dam or sabotage it by funding armed 
rebels operating in its territories by destabilizing the country. 183  Additionally, the Egyptian 
president at that time (Morsi) threatened Ethiopia by stressing  “Egypt’s water security cannot be 
violated in any way...as head of state, I confirm to you that all options are open”. He further warned 
military action might be the response  “if the Nile diminishes by one drop then blood is the 
alternative”. Other Egyptian political leaders followed suit in disseminating threats against Ethiopia 
such as the president candidate to replace Morsi, (Mortandar Mansour), also echoed the identical 
threat by reiterating he will  “order to use military force against Ethiopia upon her persistence on 
the construction of the GERD” 184. The former Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr 
also propagated this absolute opposition to GERD, by vowing not to give up "a single drop of water 
from the Nile" and "No Nile means no Egypt"185. 
 
On the Ethiopian side, Ethiopian Foreign Ministry, Dina Mufti stated that Ethiopia wouldn’t 
be  "intimidated by Egypt's psychological warfare and won't halt the dam's construction, even for 
seconds”. Furthermore Mufti indicated, “No country operates without precautions, let alone 
Ethiopia, which has a track record of defending its independence from all forces of evil”. Likewise, 
Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn expressed his disdain for Egyptian provocations 
and reiterated the construction of the GERD will advance without interruption. Foreign Minister of 
Ethiopia Tedros Adhanom also affirmed that “Ethiopia cannot remain poor it must utilize its 
resources to lift its people out of poverty”. Ethiopia indicated her vehement position by interlinking 
the construction of the dam as part and parcel of her struggle to eradicate poverty in the country. 186  
 
As this study has shown, Sudan and Egypt had a uniform and concurrent position towards water 
issues that had been arising on the Nile River. Following these controversies between Egypt and 
Ethiopia, however, the government of Sudan holds a unique and different position in supporting the 
GERD. Sudan’s government spokesman Ahmed Bilal has asked Egypt to stop war provocations 	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stances in the basin. He added that Sudan would get many benefits from the dam, including better 
supply of electricity and yearlong regulation of the Blue Nile’s flow by reciting  IPoE’s report. The 
position of Sudan was not gratified by Egypt   and one of the Egyptian political leaders described 
Khartoum's stance on the issue as  “disgusting”. 187 This is an indication that the conflict of interests 
on the GERD is not confined to Ethiopia and Egypt but impacts between Egyptian and Sudanese 
hydro political relations.  
Following these tensions, many scholars in the field speculated on a potential “water war”. 
However, with consistent negotiations and water diplomacy among these nations, the four-year 
controversy and dispute on the GERD seem to be dissipating with signature of the “Declaration of 
Principles” by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia in March 2015 at Khartoum, Sudan. Ten general 
principles were outlined in this agreement including the principle of cooperation and understanding 
of the interests of both upstream and low stream nations further stipulate: 
“ .. the role of the GERD on the development, integration and sustainability of electricity 
access in the region, principle of not causing significant harm, principle of fair and 
appropriate use of the water resource, following the technical recommendations with 
respect to the dam policies, principles of building trust, information and data exchange,  
dam safety and principle of peaceful dispute settlement in case of controversies”188 . 
 
Most of these principles are general in nature and are in line with the international water laws 
doctrines (see on chapter two). Hydro political negotiations and diplomatic efforts among these 
nations towards the GERD have been continuing. Their hydro political relations are characterized 
by sometimes in harmony and disagreement at other times.  For instance, the Eastern Blue Nile 
Basin nations were in controversy on matters of selecting a neutral consultancy firms that could 
study further impacts of the dam on one hand, they reached at an agreement to take every measures 
to build and strengthen their trilateral ties, on the other. 
 
Therefore, the GERD and its related issues have not yet settled. This study elaborates the peace and 
security implications of the GERD in the region. The methodology the study will employ is the 
Framework of Hydro hegemony. The first issue the thesis address is, does the construction of the 
GERD bring any shift in hydro-hegemony position in the Eastern Nile basin region? To entertain 
this question, the hydro hegemony positions of the three nations will be elaborated in detail. Second, 	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political and diplomatic interactions of these states will also be studied to measure them with the 
Yoffe et al’s intensity scale of cooperation or conflict in the region. Thirdly, an explanation will be 
provided with regard to the implication of the GERD on the peace and security of the region based 
on the recent hydro hegemon status and conflict intensity scale analysis.  
 
4-2) Is there a Change in Hydro-hegemony because of the Construction of the GERD?  
The concept of hydro hegemony research is mainly based on the notion “the absence of war does 
not mean absence of conflict”189. In our analysis below we will ponder on this principle to 
investigate the varieties of conflict and cooperation scenarios. State interactions ranges from the 
extreme negative position so-called war to the positive extreme-cooperation scenario regarding the 
sharing of the water resource in the Nile basin. Based on the previous analysis of this study, there 
are scholars claiming Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to construct the GERD is an indicator of hydro 
hegemony change from Egypt to Ethiopia. They hold that makes Ethiopia as a new hydro-hegemon 
in the region while others express the existence of power change due to this action of Ethiopia but it 
is not as such complete shift to replace the status quo. In the latter case, the alteration of the 
hydropower is limited to the extent to challenge historical dominative hydro hegemony of Egypt by 
Ethiopia not changing the hydro hegemony in the region (I.e., it is creating counter-hydro 
hegemony, not forming a new hydro-hegemony). In the following section the thesis focuses on 
addressing those issues by entertaining the hydro hegemony positions of the three nations in terms 
of four dimensions of power as developed by Zeitoun and Warner (2006) and revised and updated 
by Cascão and Zeitoun (2010).  
4-2-1) Hydro-hegemony Positions in Eastern Nile Basin 
First, geographical or locational position pertains to river flow directions and determines the 
riparian structure of the basin190 as upper, middle and lower riparian. In our case, Eastern Nile Basin 
nations Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt could be categorized as upper, middle and lower stream 
countries. Locations enable some countries to control the headwaters of international rivers; and it 
is also a non-dynamic or static form of hydro political leverage, which those nations employ to 
influence the lower riparian countries. Especially in the case of contentious trans boundary water 
resource, the upper riparian nations might use it as leverage by threatening to alter the quantity and 
quality of supply of water to countries down the river. When the upper riparian nations are 
hegemonic, they might use this power position to threaten the lower riparian nations by taking 
actions such as minimizing the amount of water in bargaining their foreign policy objectives. 	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“Water weapon” is a coinage provided for upstream countries’ utilization of their positions to 
manipulate the water and influence their politics depending on the political and foreign policy 
relations of the downstream countries. 191  
 
Occasionally, when nations apply this power properly, the political authority they might incur is a 
way much better than other political, military might or economic dominance. Comparatively, 
Ethiopia as an upstream country has the best geographical power position. Ethiopia has better 
geographical power leverage that could be used in times of extreme water competition scenarios. 
The complete use of this power, however, might lead to more strains and disputes among those 
nations. 192 Furthermore, there are several justifications that constitute upstream countries are in a 
better position than downstream: i) their very location grants a better authority in managing the 
quality and quantity of water than the middle or lower riparian nations: ii) mostly the courses of the 
river in the upstream nations are characterized by mountainous topography that creates more 
watersheds for those nations and enhances their efficiency and convenience for hydroelectric power 
production: iii) during river pollution they are the last to be affected in comparison with other 
downstream countries as the water empties downwards. Ethiopia´s upstream position in the Nile 
River basin bestows all these advantages as well. 193  
 
Nonetheless, the country was not in a position to exploit these advantages owing to incessant civil 
war, economic underdevelopment, external economic mobilization on water projects of the country 
and political instability in general. Today, there are some changes in those circumstances of the 
country. Though Ethiopia has less military and economic prowess than Egypt, the country has a 
better position in this political bargaining chip to construct water development projects on the Nile 
River as evidenced by the GERD. As discussed in chapter three, the cooperation and shared vision 
of the Nile riparian states has already been stifled for the number of reasons. The NBI is appraised 
for its contribution in catalyzing cooperation in the basin but it has underachieved in the 
implementation of delivering the projects of the riparians under its auspices. Due to this fact, 
Ethiopia’s planned projects under the Nile Basin initiative could not be attained. 194  This 
circumstance compounded with her upper riparian position paved the way for the country to move 
forward in constructing the GERD on the Nile River unilaterally. This confirms upstream country 	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locational power has an influence in challenging the relative lower riparian hydro hegemons such as 
Egypt. Most of the upper riparian nations recite the tenet of Herman doctrine and hydro-sovereignty 
to augment and pursue their geographical power in the basin. Additionally, the upstream countries 
such as Ethiopia also claims international customary law practice notions of “equitable and 
reasonable utilization of the shared water resources” supports her dam projects on the shared river 
basins while the lower stream countries refute these argument by reciting “no significant harm” and 
“pre-existed usage” principles (See on chapter 2). 
 
In comparison, in terms of geographic power Sudan as a middle stream country has a better position 
than Egypt. Sudan is exploiting this relative advantage by developing some hydraulic projects on 
the Nile River without giving prior notifications to Egypt.  
Conducting relevant studies on the synergic impacts of the dams to be constructed in the upper 
riparian nations are crucial or else when upstream countries such as Ethiopia implement this kind of 
power position to develop water projects in isolation, it might foment conflict and tension among 
the riparian countries. 195  
Similarly, when Ethiopia diverted the flow of the river in 2013 for the purpose of the GERD, the 
response from Egypt was one of discord and threat owing to this situation tensions were mounted. 
In other words, while Ethiopia began to use its geographic advantages in constructing the GERD, 
Egypt’s reply was increasing political pressure, military threats, and economic leverage, which 
often exacerbate conflict rather than promote cooperation. When the upper riparian countries use 
this power they should consider the interests of other lower riparian nations’ interests and studying 
the impacts of the projects on the downstream nations is also pertinent to keep the pivotal balance. 
In doing so, the upstream country assures these projects won’t have any significant harm on the 
lower riparian nations’ water interests. This will play a crucial role in avoiding controversies and 
tensions amongst common water sharing nations. Otherwise, when the lower riparian countries are 
more powerful than the upper riparians, which is true in our case, the construction of water projects 
on the upstream countries without prior notification and concurrence with the downstream countries 
might lead to conflict. Thus, the exercise of this power by the upstream state might easily 
accentuate conflict rather than cooperation. 196  
 
Ethiopia has the best geographical power position. This could be exploited as a mechanism to 
contest the Egyptian hydro hegemony in the region. Relatively speaking, Sudan has also a better 
position than Egypt in this aspect. In spite of the fact that, using this power unilaterally (without the 	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consultation and coordination with other co-riparian nations) might exacerbate tensions and be 
dangerous for the peace and security of the region as it might prone the riparian countries to 
conflicts and tension rather than cooperation as we can infer it from the interactions of the three 
nations upon the diversion of the river Nile for the GERD in 2013.   
 
Second, material power refers to the capacity of state to encompass economic and military power 
cumulatively. Though there are undeniable facts that the Eastern Nile countries are advancing in 
these sectors, Egypt commands the region; 
 A) The economic power of those nations is treated in this paper from two paradigms: the domestic 
economic capacity of individual nations, on the one side, and the economic mobilization power to 
secure external finances for water development projects and to curb other riparian nations’ foreign 
financial sources for water related project developments especially on the shared rivers, on the other 
side. For instance, this includes scenarios such as Egypt’s diplomatic measures to bar the feasible 
international financial sources of Ethiopia’s water development projects on the Nile.  
 
The economic capacity and power of these nations are mostly measured by individual state’s Gross 
Domestic Product (herein after called GDP) that refers to the sum of all goods and services 
produced in one year within a country. According to the 2014 World Bank report, Ethiopia’s GDP 
accounted for USD 55.61 billion with an annual growth rate of 10.3% while Sudan’s GDP was 
USD 73.81 billion with an annual growth rate of 3.1%. In comparison, Egypt’s GDP is more than 
the double total GDP of Ethiopia and Sudan combined at USD 286.5 billion with an annual growth 
rate of 2.2%.197 From this figures one can easily deduce that Egypt produces much more than the 
two nations, which implies Egypt’s economy is much better than the two countries. Egypt is by far 
more powerful than the two nations economically speaking though Ethiopia’s annual GDP growth 
rate is better than Egypt and Sudan as the statistics cited above demonstrates. Egypt’s relative 
strong economy is interlinked to the utilization of the Nile water with more than 95% of its 
populations are dependent on the Nile River. 
 
When the lower riparian countries are more powerful in their economy than the upper ones, states 
use their economic capacity to leverage and negotiate with the upper riparian nations through trade 
and economic aid ties. In our case, increasing market access between and among the riparian 
nations, especially the stronger lower riparian nations with the poor upstream nations, will reinforce 
benefit based economic cooperation relations. This sticks these nations to one another and 	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minimizes future water based conflicts. Because riparian states need to avoid water induced 
conflicts that might be followed by economic sanctions and loss of access to market. Fighting water 
wars or disputing with other nations will cost them more for those nations from the cost-benefit 
point of view. 198  Establishing such viable economic ties with the underdeveloped upstream 
countries empowers the wealthier lower riparian nations and guarantees them a dominant position 
in water sharing negotiations. The total amount of trade plus aid is important in transnational 
negotiations, and the percentage of GDP can infer a level of dependence on trade and aid, which 
might affect the outcome of asserting economic power.  Egypt with a better GDP had the 
opportunity to exploit this power in their interactions with upper riparian Nile Basin nations 
especially with Ethiopia. Egypt established Undugu to reinforce its economic, political and 
technical ties with the rest of the basin nations but failed to be effectuated (see under chapter three 
of this study). The recent bilateral and multilateral agreements made between Egypt and other upper 
riparian nations in economic, social and political spheres, represents the determination of Egypt to 
use her economic power creating economic integration with the upper riparian nations. These types 
of cooperation agreements entered between Egypt and Ethiopia after Ethiopia initiates the 
construction of the GERD on the Nile River is an instance.  
 
B) States access to financial aid and mobilization is another yardstick to measure the economic 
strength and power of the riparians. In other words, most of the Nile basin countries are so poor that 
they don’t have the financial power to exploit their water resources by raising their own domestic 
funds. They need external financial resources to support and develop their hydro infrastructures at 
the basin level. Some riparian nations also engage themselves in curbing the financial sources of 
upstream countries external financial access to develop their water projects on the Nile. In doing so, 
they will protect and secure their water share interests by blocking others’ access to external funds 
while they assure their own fund through diplomacy.  This is one of Egypt’s tactics used to earn her 
financial sources from, and to persuade international donors and creditors not to finance Ethiopia’s 
water projects on the Nile River. 199  External international financial source is an arena whereby 
basin countries rally to secure their interests or block others to sustain their hegemonic position in 
the basin system.  
 
Egypt is the leading hydro hegemon in the region in both domestic economic position and 
international financial mobilization capacity. Mostly economic power of a nation is also a direct 
indicator of the military power as economically stronger nations are expected to spend much more 	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on their military budget than the poor ones. This consideration also works in the case of Eastern 
Nile countries. 
 
C) Military powers. It is arduous assessing the military power of the Nile riparians because of the 
prolonged conflicts the region has experienced. Correspondingly, it is also difficult to assess each 
country’s military power positions to determine their hegemonic positions. But this study will 
evaluate this power position from military aids, annual military expenditure and military power 
ranks, points of view. 
After the 1979 Camp David accord, Egypt has had staunch relations with the West in building a 
strong military power to engage in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Egypt, for example, received about 
USD $2 billion financial aid and other military support from the US every year until recently. 
Though this aid was frozen for a while after the downfall of the President Mohammed Morsi, the 
US aid has been resumed recently by donating about USD $575m (£338m) to Egypt. 200 In this 
regard, Egypt receives more military aid from external sources like the US than Ethiopia and Sudan. 
 
The relative wealth and economic position of a country has a direct reflection on the military 
expenditures of states. Egypt has better economic power and her GDP exceeds the summation of 
Ethiopia and Sudan’s GDP combined. Hence, expectedly Egypt’s military expenditure is much 
higher than the two countries. In this regard, the Global Firepower 2016 report estimated Egypt’s 
annual military expenditure as USD 4.4 billion. Ethiopia allocates USD 340 million annually for 
defense while Sudan allots USD 2.47 billion. Global Firepower enlists nations military power 
positions by measuring military human and material components. This institution placed Egypt, 
Ethiopia and Sudan 18th, 46th and 102nd respectively in terms of military power position in the world. 
201  Additionally, in 2014 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Report (SIPRI) 
estimated 1.6% of Egypt’s GDP accounted for its military spending in comparison to Ethiopia’s 
0.7%. 202 From these discussions, one can deduce that Egypt is capable of building a modern army 
that surpasses Ethiopia and Sudan. To that end, Egypt is a military hegemon in the region as it 
exceeds Ethiopia and Sudan not only in annual military expenditure but also by securing a large 
amount of military financial aid from external sources particularly from the US. 
 
Third, bargaining or negotiation power. East African Nations and the Nile basin countries are 
synonymous with poverty. The 2015 Human Development Index (HDI) summarizes the average 	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achievement in key dimensions of human development by encompassing a long and healthy life, 
being knowledgeable and has a decent standard of living as yardsticks. This report ranked Egypt-
108th, Sudan-167th, and Ethiopia-174th. 203 In addition, the United Nations Millennium Development 
report of 2014, found out nearly a quarter of Ethiopia’s population (i.e., about 98 million) lives 
under the poverty line. Their purchasing power parity (PPP) is less than USD 1.25 per day leaving 
many unable to cover their basic needs.  204 This is an evidentiary that depicts the rampant poverty 
level in the region and countries are struggling to eradicate poverty and fulfill the United Nations 
Millennium development program goals.  
On the other spectrum, development of water projects especially dams at the basin level requires 
nations to have a strong financial sources. These could not be raised domestically without external 
financial assistance such as the World Bank. Nevertheless, there are also certain prerequisites 
nations should fulfill to secure such funds from international donors. For instance, the World 
Bank’s the OP 7.50-projects on the International Waterways stipulates: i) the state should prove that 
agreements and arrangements have been made between the beneficiary state and other riparians, ii) 
other riparians also should provide their consent or confirmation in supporting the project and it will 
not harm their water interest in the basin, or iii) in all other cases, in the assessment of Bank staff, 
the project will not cause appreciable harm to the other riparians, and will not be appreciably 
harmed by the other riparians' possible water use. Pursuant to this directive, a single disapproval of 
any dam project by any one of the member riparian states in a basin disqualifies the project’s 
financial loan that could be secured from the World Bank.205 
As Zeitoun and Warner (2006) noted, these international monetary donor institutions are not neutral 
or impartial in entertaining country´s water project cases that makes them easily susceptible to be 
influenced by the aspirations of hydro powerful nations such as Egypt in applying their policies and 
deciding on the non-hegemon countries’ financial support requests. As their policy analysis and 
recommendations are founded upon the bargaining and compromise between the stakeholders from 
which the powerful nations will always emerge as a winner in protecting their interests and 
blocking the financial sources of the non-hegemon countries. 206 Hence, financial mobilization is 
the other best mechanism the hydro hegemon of the Nile Basin (Egypt) used to dry up the feasible 
international and donor country´s financial sources of upstream countries’ in their efforts to develop 
water projects on the Nile river. International institutions have been one of water diplomacy battle 	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spot the Nile riparian nations fought for claiming and securing their water share interests in the 
basin by pondering on the international water law principles and their international political 
bargaining power as a playing card. In this aspect, Egypt has been successful in mobilizing 
international and regional basin wide institutions in her efforts to augment and maintain the 
hegemonic position on the one hand, and control the flow of the partial and aggregate amount of 
water development funds for other riparian on the Nile basin, on the other.  
This trend appears to be changing, however. Up on the development of international river laws, 
tenets of equitable and reasonable use of water are employed by upper riparian states to challenge 
the bargaining hegemonic position of Egypt that founded on the principles of “no appreciable harm” 
and historical water share rights. The upper riparian nations claim and voting powers on the 
international spheres is upgrading to the limit that they could contest the Egyptian hegemony 
especially the real challenger in this case is Ethiopia. According to Zeitoun and Allan the most 
common and ordinary form of countering the established order is bargaining power.  Thus, the 
hegemonic power of Egypt is being challenged by Ethiopia’s increasing bargaining power 
upstream.207  
 
Furthermore, the emergence and involvement of China as a major economic actor in the 
development of hydro projects in the region is changing the region’s current status quo. In line with 
Swain and Jamali (2011), the upstream countries had been restrained from developing their hydro 
projects on the Nile owing to either lack of financial and technological capacity or their 
international financial sources are impeded by campaigns of the strong bargaining power of Egypt. 
208 Correspondingly, Ethiopia has staunch ambitions to utilize and develop her water potential in the 
basin since the early 1950s. The political instability and lack of technical and financial aid were the 
main impediments for the underperformance of the country in this sector. As per to Swain and 
Jamali, the persistent campaign of Egypt to inhibit Ethiopia’s financial feasible sources of water 
development fund from the international and regional donors such as World Bank, African 
Development Bank and the European Investment Bank, had been successful for decades. The recent 
presence of China in the region is also altering this paradigm in a way that Ethiopia is getting both 
financial and technological abutment from China to construct big dams and develop hydro projects 
without resorting to other international and regional financial institutions that could fail easily to 
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Egypt’s bargaining power lobby. For instance, Chinese companies mainly funded by the Chinese 
government constructed the Tekeze and Ameriti-Neshe hydro dams in Ethiopia. 209  
 
China’s financial and technical supports in the development of water projects are not limited to 
Ethiopia but also extend to Sudan. For instance, Sudan constructed by Chinese assistance the 
Merowe hydroelectric dam that has a production capacity of about 1250 MW with a promising 
future irrigational use purposes. Sudan is engaging in the expansion of water pumping irrigation 
projects on the banks of White and Blue Nile with the technical and financial support of China.210   
 
The Chinese collaboration in the development of hydro dams in Ethiopia and Sudan are 
encouraging these nations to engage and accede to the development of unilateral hydro dam 
projects on the upstream countries without the provision of prior notification to downstream nations 
such as Egypt. The construction of the GERD is an extension and continuation of this trend in a 
way that Ethiopia decides solely to construct this big dam on the Nile by raising the local financial 
sources without resorting to international monetary donors and financial aid institutions. As the 
rising relative material, bargaining and ideation powers backed up by China’s practical whole 
inclusive support provided the country confidence to build bigger dams even without external 
financial support.  
 
Hence, China’s involvement in the region has enhanced the bargaining power of upstream countries’ 
in securing external financial and technical support sources, and relaying on domestic fund raising 
when the former fails to materialize.211  Considering the upstream country’s geographical position 
plus their increasing bargaining power in general are serving as litmus for future fierce contestation 
and the culmination of the persistent Egyptian dominative hydro hegemonic bargaining power in 
the basin. With this recent developments (Cascao, 2009) holds that Egypt has already lost its de 
facto power specifically in making the financial sources of upstream countries from international 
institutions dry.212  
 
Fourth, ideational power. It is nothing but “the capacity of a riparian to impose and legitimize 
particular ideas and narratives”213. In other terms, it is the ability to shape the perception of the 
people pertaining to the common resource distributive configuration both at domestic, regional (at 
the basin) and international level. This type of power is categorized as the least visible and 	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identifiable form of powers of hydro hegemony as it is much interlinked to power over ideas rather 
than material manifestations. In line with Cascão’s analysis, lack of knowledge and data sharing, or 
the uses of time, silence or ambiguity are some of the systematic approaches hegemonic states 
employ to manipulate other non-hegemon riparian states. In relation to this, Egypt has been 
employing delay of any water related negotiations on the basins water share that could contravene 
the persistence of the status quo of the 1959 agreement. 214  
Moreover, the hegemonic ideation power of Egypt in the Nile basin is founded on the dissemination 
of the concept of “securitization’’. Buzan et al (1998), explained securitization as presenting an 
issue as urgent and existential so that it should not be exposed under normal political discussions 
but with top leaders with prioritization of other matters is required. 215  In our case, securitization of 
water resource ensues when trans-boundary waters are sufficiently critical to a state’s survival that 
their allocation and/or modes of utilization become a matter of national concern and focus. Egypt 
considers any water related contestation in the region as a national threat and thus, water becomes 
the high political concern in the country’s security policy. These kinds of water politicization 
accounts for the zero-sum political game by the hydro hegemon that could in turn be a cause for 
tension and conflict among the basin countries as it blocks water diplomacy at its inception stage. 
216  
 
Specifically, from the start there is a belief that the survival of Egypt relies on the Nile water 
resource by quoting and re-dubbing the phrases  “the Nile is Egypt and Egypt is the Nile”, and 
“Egypt is the gift of the Nile”. The arid and semi-arid location of Egypt and the impracticability of 
conducting rain fed agriculture owing to the inadequate amount of annual rainwater (between 
25mm in Cairo and 200mm in the country’s southern part) make Egypt more than 90 percent reliant 
on the Nile River.  Owing to this dependency on the river, Egypt has been securitizing the Nile 
water issue in the region by making it the top of her priority her political agenda. Equitable sharing 
claims by the upstream countries have been transformed to the national security threat by Egypt so 
as to quash or silence those claims and to flourish her historical water interests in the basin.217  
 
Egypt has been successful in establishing the ideation power at the international level from early 
periods of time. The Nile is inseparable and integral to the country’s security and any diverted 
contestation of this fact from the upstream countries is cogitated to be a matter of controverting her 	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national security. Correspondingly, when Ethiopia started the construction of the GERD, Egyptian 
politicians affirmed this political narrative by holding  “if Nile diminishes by one drop then blood is 
the alternative” and “No Nile- No Egypt” as Former Egyptian President Morsi and Former foreign 
Minister of Egypt Muhammed Kemal Amir stipulated, respectively. 218 Fischhendler and Nathan 
(2016) hold that “as part of agenda-setting facility of securitization, certain contextual conditions 
are needed to provide substance for the plausible and effective uplifting of a water issue into the 
realm of security”. They refer to these conditions as “triggers of securitization”. 219 In this 
illustration Egypt’s triggers of securitization conditions are related to reasons that any upstream 
countries’ water related projects on the Nile have repercussions on her historical water share 
interests and potentially causes of water scarcity in the country that is against her national interest 
and security considering her high dependence on the Nile. By the same token, the construction of 
the GERD is also part and parcel of Egypt’s national water threat concern as the statements of the 
above political figures affirm.   
 
In consequence, Egypt has been the hydro hegemon in the region for decades by setting up such 
kinds of ideation power in the Nile basin system. However, upper riparian countries in general and 
Ethiopia in particular, have begun to resist and contest against this dominative ideation power by 
introducing their auspicious tenet “equitable and reasonable utilization” of water. The upstream 
countries employ this principle to strengthen and augment their ideation power to claim their share 
of water from the Nile  and use it as a weapon to fight back against Egypt’s hydro hegemony. In 
this respect, they have been successful in incorporating this notion in the NBI and in the CFA as 
one of the basic negotiation agendas of water allocation issues in the region (see at chapter three). 
The role of Ethiopia in making this principle as the integral part of the initiative and basin wide 
agreement was magnanimous. Cascão (2009) assesses Ethiopia’s progressive achievement in 
building this bargaining strategy from two angles: the realization of all riparian countries to 
negotiate on equal level, and bringing the legal issue back (equitable and reasonable utilization) to 
the focal point of the basin-wide hydro political negotiation agenda. 220 Those were the trends that 
provided concretized rational to Ethiopia to launch the construction of the GERD on the Nile in 
2011 unilaterally. 
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As shown in chapter two and three of this thesis, Egypt and Sudan have a mutual stance and 
cooperation on Nile water issues. They both allege the natural, acquired, and historical rights of the 
Nile water resource and the two nations attempts to verify their rights by international water tenets 
of primary use, prior use, acquired water rights and non-appreciable harm to the downstream 
countries. In order to secure and protect her share of water rights granted by the 1959 agreement, 
Sudan champions the acquired and established rights in congruent with Egypt. However, Sudan has 
still complained about the amount of water share acquired as per to this agreement. The volume of 
water Sudan gained from the agreement was less than the country requested for and wants to access 
more to accommodate demands of her growing population. Sudan is inclined towards the principle 
of equitable and reasonable utilization of water for any future agreements in the basin systems as 
per to Waterbury (2002). Sudanese position towards constructing ideation power stems from the 
comparative advantages the country could secure from allaying with either the upper riparian 
nations such as Ethiopia or downstream Egypt.221   
For instance, Sudan supports the construction of GERD considering the future benefits of 
minimizing and regulating the floods of the Nile water through out the year and importing hydro 
electricity from Ethiopia. On the other side, Sudan is a proponent of Egypt in matters related to the 
CFA and Nile Basin initiative. Egypt is the dominant ideation power hydro hegemon in the region 
but upstream countries such as Ethiopia are efficaciously and insistently challenging this Egypt’s 
power. 
Considering Nile water as an intrinsic element of Egyptian life still extends to the present day. 
Recently, when the three nations made a deal on the GERD on March 23, 2015, Egypt’s president 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi reiterated the concept of securitization:  “You will develop and grow and I am 
with you, but be aware that in Egypt the people live only on the water that comes from this river” 
which reaffirmed the Nile water is the only means of the Egyptian survival and security. 222 
However, Egypt appears to be reversing its water securitization policy  and beginning to de-
securitize it that could be proved by Egypt’s recent compromises and agreements made with the 
upper riparian nations such as Sudan and Ethiopia. In this regard, the trilateral general agreement of 
March 2015 could be mentioned as an instance where the three governments vowed to the principle 
of not to cause significant harm, principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of the shared water 
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resource and regarding the operation and procedure of the filling of water for the GERD. 223 The 
principles of this agreement are general in nature but they are evidentiary to clarify how Egypt has 
started to de-securitize the Nile water issue by engaging in such agreements that mainly 
incorporates the equitable and reasonable utilization of water resource of the Nile River. That 
provides the upper riparian nations the right to utilize their share, which was impossible and stifled 
by Egypt’s hydro hegemony previously.  
Egypt has manifestly been the hydro hegemon in the region because of its relatively strong, 
diversified, and well-integrated economic power in comparison to other riparian countries in the 
Eastern Nile basin system. Egypt’s geostrategic position the Middle East has also created conducive 
environment to partner with the international community and the Western countries like the US. 
These circumstances have merited Egypt with financial aids from international donors and to block 
foreign water development financial sources of other upstream countries such as Ethiopia through 
political and diplomatic lobbying. Owing to these reasons and others discussed above, Egypt leads 
the Eastern Nile Basin nations in material power (including economic and military power), 
bargaining and ideation power. Nonetheless, Egypt is not dominant in terms of the geographic or 
locational power of which the country is surpassed by the upper and middle riparian nations of 
Ethiopia and Sudan, respectively. Additionally, in line with (Cascão 2009), the latter two nations 
are building their political and economic power position much stronger than they were a decade ago, 
which empowers them to contest the Egyptian hydro hegemony position in the basin. The 
increasing negotiation and ideation power of equitable and reasonable water use cumulated with 
their rising bargaining power due to the involvement of external financial and technical sources (i.e., 
China), equipped them well to counter the status quo hydro hegemonic power position of Egypt in 
the basin.224 These power alterations have enabled the upper riparian countries to conduct unilateral 
water development projects such as the GERD. 
The next sub-sections comprehends how Egypt maintains he power?, what are these strategic 
mechanisms employed to maintain this position for these long periods of time?  How do the non-
hegemon states such as Ethiopia counter Egypt’s historical hegemony? 
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4-2-2) Strategies of Hydro-hegemon in Eastern Nile Basin  
International law is not efficient in regulating controversies over international river issues as 
expounded in chapter two. Egypt hydrological or geographical location is its natural destiny as a 
lower riparian hegemonic state. The power disparity between Egypt and all other riparians 
(especially Ethiopia and Sudan) has paved the way for Egypt to employ its power for ensuring other 
upper riparian states “remain weak, unstable, and underdeveloped and thus incapable of 
constructing large water projects” for decades225. Politics dominates the legal aspect in water share 
contestations in the Nile basin and Egypt utilized both overt and covert apparatuses over the non-
hegemons to assure its incessant dominance in the basin system. For this Egypt used multiple 
strategies: 
First, coercive compliance-producing mechanism, which is based upon military force or covert 
action and coercion.226 Egypt is the most powerful state in the region in terms of its military power 
as our above discussion clearly depicts and the country has been using this power to coerce any 
water based developments on the Nile by the upstream countries.  Egypt has been very receptive to 
any upstream water related projects and efforts to utilize the Nile water with due focus on 
Ethiopia’s actions. As reiterated above, Egypt has warned Ethiopia that any impediment to the flow 
of Blue Nile waters will be seen as casus belli for Egypt repetitively. 227 This was what happened 
again when Ethiopia began to divert the flow of the Nile River for the purpose of GERD 
construction, politicians in Cairo proposed to bomb the dam as they were discussing about the 
GERD issue in secrete. Though Egypt has not taken such military actions so far, her political 
leaders expressions on the matter is an indicator that Egypt has adopted the threat of military action 
on the dam as a coercive-pressure mechanism to pressurize Ethiopia from developing the GERD 
project farther.  
 
Historically, there are some suspicions on the Ethiopian and Sudanese side that Egypt has engaged 
in providing military support for rebellions of the two countries.228 This allegation also works for 
the military equipment support Egypt was providing for Eritrean government and when the latter 
was at war with Ethiopia. The continued convergence of political, economic, military cooperation 
and the reciprocal visits of higher officials between Egypt and Eritrea recently, supports the 
argument that Egypt is still employing her ‘invisible’ power to compromise Ethiopia’s stability 	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through Eritrea. The reason behind this is that the antagonistic relationship with Ethiopia, Eritrea is 
known for harboring and supporting Ethiopia’s armed oppositions while the latter is doing the same 
to Eritrean oppositions. Hence, the military cooperation between Eritrea and Egypt emanates from 
the former’s unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia and the latters effort to divert Ethiopia’s water 
development focus by destabilizing the country.229 By conducting proxy wars and providing 
military support to upstream countries’ are adversary with are part of these types of Egypt’s 
coercive producing mechanism to destabilize these nations so their water development agendas are 
diverted towards resolving their internal conflicts. This was also manifestly discussed as one of the 
covert action options Egypt’s political leaders advising as a measure to be taken by President Morsi 
so as to halt the GERD construction. 
Second, utilitarian compliance-producing mechanisms, which are a strategy to trade incentives 
through diplomatic recognitions, military protection and focusing on the shared interest of water 
projects. These types of incentive-based compliance mechanisms are the direct opposite scenarios 
of coercive mechanism. 230  This is also part of Egypt’s mechanism to preserve her hegemonic 
status in the region. This tactic has been implemented by Egypt in her relations with Sudan. 
Recently, following the construction of the GERD, Egypt reinforced its military, political and 
economic ties with Sudan and Ethiopia as manifestly replicated under the trilateral cooperation 
agreements made on March 24,2015 and February 20,2016. The latter pact particularly ponders on 
strengthening the relations of those nations based on their common interests and elaborates further 
to create a joint fund for the implementation of development projects.231  
Third, normative compliance-producing mechanism is related to the legal aspect of compliance 
mechanism in which Egypt has made to institutionalize her hegemonic position by entering and 
incorporating some of the stream nations such as Sudan in the 1959 agreement or by excluding the 
upper riparian nations in some agreements like Ethiopia. These agreements mainly adhere to 
Egypt’s interests and ignore the interests of other riparian states. 232  
Fourth, the hegemonic compliance is another mechanism that Egypt most widely adhered to. It is 
one of recognizable tactics Egypt employed in the Eastern Nile Basin Nations. (Most of Egypt’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 ) AllAfrica, Ethiopia: The "Nile Factor" and Pragmatic Opportunism in Egypt-Eritrea Relations 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201410061115.html accessed on March 28, 2016. 
230) Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 447. 
231) Sudan Tribune, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan agree to enhance cooperation, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58075, accessed on March 28,2016; Aljazeera, Egypt, Ethiopia and 
Sudan sign accord on Nile Dam, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-sign-accord-nile-dam-
150323193458534.html, accessed on March 28, 2016 . 
232) Zeitoun and Warner (2006), 448. 
	   72	  
hegemonic compliance producing mechanisms is discussed with the four pillars of hydro hegemony 
section above). 
Egypt’s hydro hegemony strategies and its persistence in the region is the cumulative outcome of 
her tactics explicated above. Egypt’s hydro hegemony could be summed up as a negative hydro 
hegemony in a way that Egypt exerted all of her dominative power on the whole part of the pillars 
of hegemony discussed above. Pursuant to Cascão (2009) “the combination of stronger material, 
bargaining and ideational power has allowed Egypt to develop a hydro-hegemonic status in the 
basin vis-à-vis the other riparians, and to maintain the regime that best served its national 
interests”.233  
However, the non-hegemon states of Ethiopia and Sudan have contested Egypt’s command in the 
basin. Thus, they began to protect and/or secure their water interests against the hydro hegemon by 
developing their own counter-hegemony mechanisms and unilateral projects such as the GERD. 
Some of the counter-hegemony mechanisms are expounded below.  
  4-2-3) Counter-hydro-hegemony Strategies in the Eastern Nile Basin  
Pursuant to Cascão (2009) deliberation, for the mere fact that there is a negative dominative hydro-
hegemon in the Nile basin does not mean that this asymmetrical relation is uncontestable by the 
non-hegemons. Hence, the mechanism used by the non-hegemons to defy the domination of the 
powerful (hydro hegemony) in the basin system is called counter-hydro-hegemony strategies or 
tactics.234 Zeitoun and Warner (2006) hold that  “states perceiving negative forms of hydro-
hegemony may resort to a number of counter-hydro-hegemony strategies to improve their 
situation”235. Sudan and Ethiopia were not efficacious in their efforts to encounter the historical 
negative hydro hegemony of Egypt in the Basin due to economic, social and political restraints and 
instabilities discussed above. The recent internal and external economic and political changes in 
Sudan and Ethiopia have widened the chances to employ their various mechanisms to challenge 
Egypt’s hydro hegemon in the region.  
 
First, Sudan and Ethiopia have been known for their internal conflict, political instability and 
economic underdevelopment. Their economic progress and political stability have already been 
improved especially in the case of Ethiopia since the 1990s, empowering her material power further 	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in the region. This paradigm shift supplemented by the financial and technical support of China has 
brought a change in querying Egypt’s hydro hegemony in the region.236 Additionally, the recent 
growth of economic and material power strength of Ethiopia and Sudan is allowing them to develop 
their respective unilateral hydraulic infrastructures on the Nile basin without notifying Egypt which 
is also part of countering the hegemon in the region. Homer Dixon (2010) reiterates the reaction of 
individual farmers in Ethiopia in building micro-dams on the tributaries of the Nile River is 
tantamount to counter Egypt’s hegemony in the basin.237 With the same analogy, there are a number 
of water projects that could be recited as instances of unilateral water projects developed by 
Ethiopia and Sudan as techniques to counter Egypt’s hegemony and the GERD is the main and the 
most controversial instance in this respect. The domestic financial sources for the construction of 
this dam also witness the growing material capability of Ethiopia to challenge the hydro hegemony 
in the basin system.  
Second, Ethiopia has successfully employed her bargaining power to influence hydro political 
relations in the region and achieved it by promoting multilateral legal and institutional frameworks 
that mainly encompasses the international water laws and norms. Ethiopia’s recourse and influence 
over the negotiations of the NBI and CFA to validate the principle of  “equitable and reasonable 
utilization” of the shared water resource have a positive double upheaval in protecting her water 
share interest and downplaying the previous Nile water accords that are detrimental to the upstream 
countries, on one side, and contesting Egypt’s hydro hegemony, on the other side.  Hence, the 
historic or acquired water rights of Egypt and Sudan are being contested by the upstream countries 
in general and Ethiopia in particular, by resonating their claims and reciting the international water 
law tenets such as  “equitable and reasonable utilization”. It is specifically this legal realm that 
guarantees the strength to Ethiopia to contest the status quo of Egypt’s hydro hegemony and to 
proceed with her water projects. 238  
The third tactic is the exploitation of the presence of Chinese human (engineers), material and 
financial resources already available in the region in the construction sector. China’s diversified 
financial and technical contracts do not require a prerequisite of other standards to be fulfilled (such 
as the concurrence of all the riparian countries on a certain water project on the common river 
basin) as stipulated in the World Bank water project criteria. This condition created unique 
prospects for upstream Nile riparian nations including Ethiopia and Sudan to utilize the support. 
This episode is moving Sudan and Ethiopia to engage in their new respective unilateral water 	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projects on the Nile River without the need to consult the hydro hegemon Egypt on the matter that 
in turn tantamount to countering the established hydro hegemony of Egypt. 239  This is also true for 
many water-based projects on the Nile basin by Ethiopia and Sudan. Though the lion share of the 
financial source of the GERD is domestically raised and the construction company in charge is not 
Chinese (instead it is Italian construction company called Salini-impregilo)240, the unilateral 
decision of Ethiopia to construct this dam is a logical extension of the other Ethiopian hydraulic 
projects supported by Chinese construction companies and funded by China’s government. Hence, 
we can infer that the emergence of China in the region has a direct and ancillary influence on the 
GERD.  
To conclude, Egypt is still the hydro hegemon in the region in terms of material power (economic 
and military), bargaining power and ideation power but not geographic power in which Ethiopia 
and Sudan has a better lead. Egypt is still striving to maintain the status quo of her negative 
dominative hydraulic command in the region by implementing a number of strategies and 
techniques explicated in the above discussions. The non-hegemons of the basin especially Ethiopia 
and Sudan are challenging this historical Egypt’s hydro hegemony by applying various mechanisms 
of which engaging in unilateral water development on the common basin is a segment. Practically, 
Ethiopia commenced to erect the giant hydroelectric dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile in 2011 that 
triggers tensions (at least in the beginning) in the region. The contestation due to the GERD whether 
it becomes the ground for future conflict or cooperation is evaluated by employing Yoffe’s event 
interaction intensity scale measurement by taking the major interaction events from media sources.  
     4-2-4) Eastern Nile Basin Nations Major Political Event Interactions after the Start of 
GERD Construction  
The author of this thesis believes that consulting governmental policy documents and conducting 
interviews with the respective appropriate government officials would have also been ideal sources 
to assess the major interactions among /between these nations. However, this could not be achieved 
due to a lack of funding and other encumbrances. Instead, to fill the lacuna and address the main 
research question this study employed media sources that encompass two international media 
outlets (Aljazeera- http://www.aljazeera.com and BBC-http://www.bbc.com), three governmental 
media sources representing each country (Ethiopia - http://waltainfo.com, Egypt-
http://www.sis.gov.eg, and Sudan- http://gmsudan.sd/en/) and one private media that is selected for 
the reason that it propagates the regional matters with a better and wider perspective (I.e., 	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http://www.sudantribune.com). The main rationalizations for selecting these media sources are: i) 
their popularity and provision of relatively credible information for their wider audiences, ii) their 
diversification in containing international, governmental and private medias and, iii) employing the 
governmental medias as a source assists the research to track each of the riparian countries’ 
governmental positions on GERD issues. Besides, this research focuses on the facts as it only 
evaluates the interactions between these states in a way it avoids the feasible media biases of 
author’s credibility and reliability questions out rightly. Besides the detail procedures of applying 
these sources were: 
First, the time frame the data covers in this research has been delineated between 2011 and December 31st, 2015. 
Second, in each of these medias sources words such as “the GERD”, “Ethiopian dam”, “Egypt and Ethiopia”, “Sudan 
and Egypt”, “Sudan and Ethiopia”, “Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan”, “dams on the Nile”, “cooperation in the Nile basin” 
and “conflict or tension in the Nile basin” were employed separately and/or in combination as a search engine phrases 
to filter out the relevant sources. Third, the contents of the data have been scrutinized to determine their relevance to the 
issue and to assure whether they are major events or not.  Fourth, the contents of the data are also studied before their 
quantitative designation is assigned as per to Yoffe’s yardsticks. Fifth, the date of the major event issued on the media, 
the multilateral or bilateral major interaction events and their sources are recorded on the tables below (see tables from 
1-8 ). Six, the average interaction quantification for each bilateral or multilateral interactions have been calculated by 
summing up the whole year major interaction quantifications provided divided by the addition of the numbers of events. 
Their results for each bilateral and multilateral interaction events have been registered in a separate table (see the tables 
with double blue asterisks (**) below). Seven, a chart that depicts the positive (cooperation) interaction or negative 
(conflictive) interaction have been drawn for each bilateral (between Ethiopia and Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, and, 
Egypt and Sudan) or multilateral (amongst Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan) scenario (see the graphs 1-4 below). And finally, 
illustrations for those results have been provided separately before stepping to the conclusive remarks.  
*****Note: Yoffe’s conflict intensity scale measurement ranges between -7<x<7. The higher the score of the scale 
from 0 to 7 means the interaction between the states is more of cooperation and the durability of peace and security 
interactions between the stats are progressive and guaranteed.  While the lower the scale score from 0 to -7 represents 
the interaction is more tend to be negative or conflictive and as a result the peace and security of these nations is volatile 
and it might lead to war when the score is as low as -7. Further details of the methodology and procedures of how 
designation of the numbers conducted and other related issues have been discussed in detail under chapter one and in 
this section the thesis only focuses on elaborating on assessments and their results. This subsection interlinks the 
interaction of those nations on the one hand, and the implication of conflict and cooperation aspects of these 
interactions on the peace and security of the region (after the initiation of Ethiopia to build the GERD), on the other. 
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Table 1 -Major event interaction scale between Ethiopia and Egypt 
Time of the 
interaction/event  
Major interaction events 
between Ethiopia and 
Egypt  
Conflict 
/cooperation 
intensity 
scale 
quantified as 
per to Yoffe 
et al. 
Sources 
02/04/2011 Former Ethiopian Prime 
Minister lays the corner 
stone of the GERD 
0 http://waltainfo.com 
19/09/2011 Ethiopia and Egypt 
reach a deal over the 
Nile Dam 
2 http://www.aljazeera.com 
23/09/2012 Egyptian irrigation 
minister expressed their 
concern about 
construction of 
Ethiopian dam  
-1 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
04/06/2013 Egyptian politicians 
caught in on-air 
Ethiopian dam gaffe 
-2 http://www.bbc.com 
05/06/2013 Tripartite final report on 
Ethiopian Dam design 
deficit (President Morsi 
expressed Egypt will not 
cede any drop of water 
of its own share in the 
Nile River) 
-2  http://www.sis.gov.eg 
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10/06/2013 ``No force could stop 
Nile Dam project`` 
Ethiopia reply for the 
war threat from Egypt  
-1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
11/06/2013  Egyptian President 
warns against Ethiopian 
dam  
-2 http://www.bbc.com 
12/06/2013 Egypt escalates war of 
words over Ethiopia´s 
Nile dam project  
-2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
12/06/2013 Ethiopia discards 
Egypt´s threats over the 
Nile dam  
-1 http://www.aljazeera.com 
18/06/2013 Egypt and Ethiopia 
agree to bridge dam 
divide  
2 http://www.aljazeera.com 
12/07/2013  ``Construction of the 
dam won´t halt for a 
second ``Ethiopian 
Foreign Minister  
-1 http://waltainfo.com 
19/07/2013 GERD never stop even 
for a second: Ethiopian 
Water and Energy 
Minister  
-1 http://waltainfo.com 
20/07/2013 Egypt is concerned 
about Ethiopian dam  
-1 http://www.aljazeera.com 
22/07/2013 Ethiopian and Egyptian 
Foreign Ministers 
discuss Nile dam issue  
1 http://waltainfo.com 
06/11/2013 Ethiopia: Egypt 
objections delaying the 
Panel  
-1 http://www.aljazeera.com 
20/11/2013 Egypt and Ethiopian 
leaders meet over Nile 
1 http://www.aljazeera.com 
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raw  
23/12/2013 Egypt Irrigation 
Minister: still have time 
to deal with negative 
impact of Ethiopian dam  
0 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
11/03/2014  Ethiopia Minister of 
Water irrigation and 
energy ``we never 
glance at Egypt´s cheap 
propaganda`` 
-1 http://waltainfo.com 
 
28/03/2014 Ethiopian dam an issue 
of no compromise: the 
dam is against Egypt´s 
national security as it is 
more interlinked to the 
water security  
-1 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
03/04/2014 Foreign Minister of 
Egypt discuss about 
Ethiopian dam crisis 
with the UN chief  
0 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
07/04/2014 Egypt presidential 
hopeful threatens to use 
force over Ethiopian 
dam  
-2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
21/04/2014 Egypt to escalate 
Ethiopian dam dispute  
-2 http://www.aljazeera.com 
11/05/2014 Egypt Prime Minister 
expressed Ethiopian 
dam crisis to be solved 
through dialogue and 
economic cooperation  
1 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
23/05/2014 Egypt´s stance on the 
Ethiopian dam is clear: 
securing the water 
1 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
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interests through 
negotiation  
27/05/2014 Egypt´s presidential 
runner pledges to 
peacefully resolve dam 
raw with Ethiopia  
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
14/06/2014 Ethiopia welcomes 
Egypt´s change of heart 
over Nile water raw  
1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
29/08/2014 Prime minister of Egypt 
receive report on the 
Ethiopian dam talks  
0 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
04/09/2014 Colonial era Nile water 
agreements unfair: 
Ethiopian ambassador  
 
-1 http://waltainfo.com 
04/09/2014 Egypt´s foreign Minister 
visit Ethiopia for dam 
talks  
1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
06/09/2014 Egypt´s Irrigation 
Minister receive 
invitation to visit 
Ethiopian dam  
1 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
03/11/2014 5th Ethio-Egypt joint 
Ministerial meeting  
0 http://waltainfo.com 
03/11/2014 Ethiopia-Egypt trade 
deals to ease River Nile 
raw  
4 http://www.bbc.com 
03/11/2014 Ethiopian Foreign 
Minister expressed 
committee meetings on 
Ethiopian dam going 
well: cooperation 
between the two 
2 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
	   80	  
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**Table 2 annual average event interaction scales between Ethiopia and Egypt 
Year of event interactions  Average of the interaction event  
2011 1 
2012 -1 
2013 -0.71  
2014 0.376 
2015 1 
countries in trade and 
investment field is also 
developing  
02/02/2015 Egypt`s president and 
Ethiopian Prime 
Minister agree on 
further GERD 
coordination  
2 http://waltainfo.com 
25/03/2015 Ethiopia and Egypt Vow 
to resolve their water 
dispute  
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
09/11/2015  Egypt accuses Ethiopia 
of stalling talks on Nile 
dam project  
-2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
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From this graphic and chart analysis, one can deduce that the major interaction events between 
Egypt and Ethiopia were initially based on cooperation when Ethiopia started to construct the 
GERD in 2011. However, this positive cooperation scenario did not persist for that long. It was 
substituted by words of war on the Egyptian side and more political frictions and tensions were 
rampant in 2012 and their interaction reached the negative peak (-2) in some instances. The details 
of the event record on table (1) above displays negative outcomes after the diversion of the Nile 
water for the purpose of the dam in 2013. Later, the multilateral and bilateral discussions and 
negotiations on the details of the dam lead to the improvement of the interactions of the two nations 
as clearly indicated on the above table from (0.376) in 2014 to (1) in 2015. From this we can 
construe that the construction of the GERD created discord between the two nations initially. 
Especially, when Ethiopia took concrete measures such as the diversion of the river water for the 
GERD. Through time this was amended and replaced by cooperation agreements and dialogue 
between the two nations. Hence, the major interactions denote the progressive improvement and 
relative congruent stance on the GERD, which lead to the domination of cooperation between the 
two nations. This result disproves  scholars position on the feasibility of future violent conflicts 
between the two nations because of the dam within the specified time frame of this study.   
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Table 3 major event interaction scales between Ethiopia and Sudan 
Time of the 
interaction/ 
Event date  
Major interaction events 
between Ethiopia and 
Sudan  
Conflict 
/cooperation 
Intensity 
scale 
quantified as 
per to Yoffe 
et al. 
Sources  
05/04/2012 Sudan supports Ethiopia’s 
Nile dam  
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
10/08/2012 Ethiopia embarks on 
Sudan power supply 
testing  
1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
30/05/2013 Sudan downplays 
negative impact of 
Ethiopian dam 
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
24/06/2013  Sudan and South Sudan 
diplomats voice in support 
of Ethiopian dam  
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
30/06/2013 Ethiopia’s Nile dam cuts 
Sudan’s expenditure on 
siltation  
1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
01/05/2014 Sudan’s Bashir affirm 
support for Ethiopian dam 
project  
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
15/09/2014 Ethiopia and Sudan set to 
launch joint military 
operation  
5 http://www.sudantribune.com 
16/09/2014 Sudan’s parliamentary 
speaker visits Ethiopia  
1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
21/02/2015 Ethiopia seek to convert 
common borders into 
integration zone  
3 http://gmsudan.sd/en/ 
26/02/2015 Sudan’s Minister of 1 http://gmsudan.sd/en/ 
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Interior meets Ethiopian 
Assembly speaker 
24/07/2015 Sudan seeks to purchase 
electricity from Ethiopia  
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
16/09/2015 Addis Ababa praises 
Sudan for repatriating 
Ethiopian rebels  
2 http://gmsudan.sd/en/ 
08/12/2015 Al Bashir says Ethiopian 
Renaissance dam become 
a reality  
2 http://gmsudan.sd/en/ 
 
**Table 4 annual average event interaction scales between Ethiopia and Sudan 
Year of event interactions Average of the interaction event 
2011 No record found 
2012 2 
2013 1.6  
2014 2.6  
2015 2 
 
 
 
As demonstrated on Table-3 and Table-4 above, all the major event interactions between Sudan and 
Ethiopia are positive ranging from (1) to a maximum of (5) when the two nations agreed to launch 
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joint military operations. In other words, the records demonstrate that their interaction after the 
construction of the GERD has always been positive (hence more inclined to cooperation). This 
concurrence between the two nations is increasing from time to time as shown from the above 
quantitative indicators of (2) in 2012 to (2.6) in 2014 and (2) in 2015. From these major interaction 
of the two nations, it is possible to contemplate that their interactions are always centered on 
collaboration and it is progressively improving. The construction of the GERD is strengthening 
their mutual interaction and interests between the two nations. Hence,  positive results of their 
interaction also clarify the existence of a durable peace and coexistence between them. The main 
reasons for this are the benefits Sudan will incur from the GERD especially in controlling the flow 
of the Nile River and importing hydroelectric energy once completed. These returns compounded 
by cooperation agreements in other socio-economic sectors are reinforcing their pre-existed positive 
political diplomacy. Particularly, their recent military and economic agreements assure the 
continuation and expansion of this positive interaction.  
 
Table 5 major event interaction scales between Egypt and Sudan 
Time of the 
interaction/ 
Event date 
Major interaction events 
between Egypt and Sudan 
Conflict 
/cooperation 
Intensity 
scale 
quantified as 
per to Yoffe 
et al. 
Sources  
25/09/2012 Egypt denies deal with 
Sudan to strike Ethiopian 
dam  
-1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
31/05/2013 Egypt and Sudan discuss 
the impact of Ethiopian 
dam 
0 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
19/02/2014 Sudan Foreign Minister 
criticizes Egypt over 
Ethiopian dam  
-1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
10/05/2014 Sudan slams Egyptian 
media’s provocation over 
Ethiopian dam  
-1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
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22/02/2015 Al-Sisi :I trust Al Bashir 
We have a lot to do jointly  
1 http://gmsudan.sd/en/ 
14/04/2015  Al Bashir and Al Sisi meet 
in Egypt and discusses 
about economy and mutual 
relations  
1 http://gmsudan.sd/en/ 
05/09/2015 Al-Bashir visit Egypt as 
his first external visit after 
inauguration  
1 http://gmsudan.sd/en/ 
 
 
**Table 6 annual average event interaction scales between Egypt and Sudan 
Year of event interactions Average of the interaction event 
2011 No record found  
2012 -1 
2013 0 
2014 -1 
2015 1 
 
 
 
Historically, Egypt and Sudan have had uniform and joint positions towards matters relative to the 
Nile river water resource issues. But the construction of the GERD coupled with other adverse 
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forms of political interactions between them turned their age-old affirmative diplomacy into partial 
tensions and negative interactions as the quantification of the above tables and chart exhibits. 
Particularly, their differences were evident in 2012 till 2014 that fluctuates with in an average 
interaction of (-1) on the intensity scale. In spit of the fact that their interaction was increasingly 
changing into positive as we can extrapolate it from the above records especially in 2015 it was (1). 
Likewise, the multilateral and bilateral dialogues and accords among these nations with respect to 
the GERD are continuing smoothly and this circumstance has a positive impact on their dual 
interactions. Their political relation is improving from time to time which in turn have an 
affirmative influence on the development of durable peace and trust-based interactions between 
them (the later event interactions positive number and continuous increment justifies it).  
 
Table 7 major event interaction scales among Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan 
Date of the 
event 
Interactions  
Major event Interactions 
among Ethiopia, Egypt and 
Sudan  
  
Interaction 
conflict/coop
eration 
intensity 
scale score as 
per to Yoffe 
et al. 
Sources  
25/09/2011 Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan 
agreed on tripartite 
committee on Ethiopian dam  
1 http://waltainfo.com 
09/11/2011 Egypt´s Minister of 
Communication and 
Information technology 
cooperation with the Nile 
basin is priority of Egypt  
0 http://waltainfo.com 
10/01/2012 Committee on Ethiopian dam 
begins to work  
1 http://waltainfo.com 
29/01/2012 Three way committee on the 
Nile dam meets at Addis 
Ababa 
1 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
28/02/2012 Tripartite meeting to talk 
over the Nile dam  
1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
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13/05/2012 Three way meetings probes 
Ethiopian dam construction  
1 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
13/09/2012 Nile Tripartite committee 
meets in Addis  
1 http://waltainfo.com 
10/10/2012 Tripartite committee on Blue 
Nile meets in Ethiopian 
capital  
1 http://www.sudantribune.com  
15/10/2012 Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan to 
resume Eastern Nile basin 
cooperation  
2 http://waltainfo.com 
28/05/2013 Ethiopia diverts the blue Nile 
for controversial dam build 
0 http://www.bbc.com 
28/07/2013 Ethiopian Prime Minister 
expressed the capacity of 
GERD not negotiable  
0 http://waltainfo.com 
19/09/2013 Ethiopia urges Sudan and 
Egypt to implement panel’s 
report on Nile dam  
-1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
11/10/2013 Downstream countries to 
hold talks with Ethiopia over 
dam  
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
19/10/2013 Ethiopia seeks Egypt and 
Sudan support in key dam 
project  
1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
09/12/2013 Second round talk over 
Ethiopian dam continued  
2 http://waltainfo.com 
16/12/2013 Ethiopian, Egyptian and 
Sudanese panel to pursue 
technical studies on the 
Ethiopian Dam  
1 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
02/01/2014 New tripartite talk will 
resume in Sudan  
1 http://waltainfo.com 
01/09/2014 Egypt selects its experts to 
Ethiopian dam panel  
0 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
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23/09/2014 Tripartite national committee 
to reexamine Nile dam  
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
24/09/2014 Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia 
agree on committee for Nile 
Dam 
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
07/03/2015  Tripartite committee agreed 
on mechanisms for operating 
the Ethiopian dam  
2 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
20/03/2015 Nile water Committee 
discusses on a draft on 
Ethiopian dam  
2 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
23/03/2015 Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan 
sign a deal to end Nile 
Dispute  
4 http://www.bbc.com 
23/02/2015 Declaration of principles on 
the Ethiopian dam signed by 
the three leaders  
4 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
24/03/2015 Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt 
sign accord on Nile dam 
4 http://www.aljazeera.com 
24/03/2015 Nile water countries sign 
framework deal on the GERD 
4 http://www.sudantribune.com 
02/04/2015  Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan to 
announce consultancy firms 
next week 
2 http://waltainfo.com 
10/04/2015 Three countries select 
consultancy firms on 
Ethiopian dam  
2 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
11/04/2015 Egypt’s irrigation minister 
reported appraisal on the 
meeting  
2 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
02/07/2015 Tripartite technical meetings 
on the Ethiopian dam started  
2 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
06/07/2015  Three Nile basin nations 
build confidence on 
2 http://waltainfo.com 
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justifiable reasonable 
utilization 
19/07/2015 Sudan hosts the tripartite 
committee meeting on 
Ethiopian dam  
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
22/07/2015 Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan in 
new talks over the GERD 
1 http://waltainfo.com 
19/08/2015 New round of Ethiopian dam 
talks continued  
2 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
18/09/2015 Tripartite meeting on 
Ethiopian dam continued  
2 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
23/08/2015  Tripartite committee to 
decide on the contentious 
points of the GERD 
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
08/11/2015 Ethiopia says consultants 
failed to reach joint vision on 
the GERD 
0 http://www.sudantribune.com 
12/11/2015 Tripartite committee on the 
dam fails to resolve the dam 
issue  
-1 http://www.sudantribune.com 
04/12/2015 Tripartite meetings to discuss 
on technical issues on 
Ethiopian dam  
2 http://www.sis.gov.eg 
18/12/2015 Sudan Foreign Minister says 
recent meetings over the Nile 
dam achieved positive 
outcome  
2 http://www.sudantribune.com 
30/12/2015 Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia 
reach agreement on 
Renaissance dam  
4 http://www.sudantribune.com 
30/12/2015 Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan 
signed a new deal on Nile 
Dam  
4 http://www.aljazeera.com 
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**Table 8 annual average event interaction scales among Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan 
Year of event interactions Average of the interaction event 
2011 1 
2012 0.08 
2013 0.71 
2014 1.5 
2015 2.2 
 
 
 
 The event interactions among the three nations are positive and are even better comparing to the 
bilateral interactions discussed above (except the interactions between Sudan and Ethiopia). Like 
the bilateral interactions the study dealt them above, the multi-lateral interactions among those 
nations are progressively improving. That indicates the annual average interactions intensity scale  
designates positive increment such as 2011-(1) , 2014-(1.5)  and 2015-(2.2), though it is decreased 
in 2012 to (0.08) and in 2013 to (0.71). In other words, the political tensions arose between Ethiopia 
and Egypt when the former redirected the flow of the Blue Nile water for the dam due to this fact 
their interaction intensity scale decreased in 2012 and 2013 to (0.08) and (0.71), respectively.  
There was also a controversy over the findings of the tripartite IPoE’s report that impacted their 
interaction. Nonetheless, the signature of December 2015 tripartite deal about the GERD that took 
their interaction scale as high as (4) affirms that these nations are still exerting their full efforts to 
create cooperation in matters related to this dam. Additionally, their pacts on other socio-economic 
sectors are enhancing through time. Hence, the construction of the GERD is creating more and 
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more mutual based integration and cooperation among those nations in particular and in the region 
in general as the above data manifestly demonstrates. Hence, it is feasible to imply that this boosts 
the durability and perpetuation of  peace and security in the basin system for the period covered by 
this study.  
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5) CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study sought to answer the main research question “Does the construction of the Ethiopian 
Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile cause more cooperation or conflict among the Eastern Nile 
basin nations?” In order to determine whether the construction of GERD is inducing cooperation or 
conflict among these nations, this study conducted a research based on framework of hydro-
hegemony methodology as developed by Zeitoun and Warner (2006) and later updated by Cascão 
and Zeitoun (2010). According to the former authors, the analysis of this framework bases itself on 
refining and capturing two water conflict predictions together Frey’s (1993) power-analytic 
framework and Yoffe (2001) water conflict event intensities scale into one so-called the framework 
of hydro-hegemony. The reflection of hydro political power asymmetries and assessing conflict 
interaction intensities concurrently on this framework increased the accuracy of the outcome of the 
research. Thus, it also provides guidance to measure the current status of hydro-politics relations in 
the Eastern Nile countries.  
 
The theoretical analysis of the study comprises two general chapters (chapter two and three) and the 
fourth main chapter. The second chapter dealt that international water law that governs states’ 
hydro-relations is at its infancy stage and lacks hard power to settle the possible conflicts arising 
between/among riparian nations over the utilization and apportion of shared water resources. 
However, its customary rules provide foundational tenets such as the right to use equitable and 
reasonable utilization, and the obligation not to cause harm on other co-riparians. Additionally, it 
imposes procedural duties embracing obligation to cooperate with other co-riparian states in 
providing the appropriate information and notify them about project developments on the common 
water resource. The study also showed that these developing customary international water rules are 
playing crucial roles in establishing soft/bargaining power of the riparian nations in a basin. The 
absence of strong water legal system at the international arena compounded by the increasing 
demand of scarce water resource are compelling these states to utilize their political and diplomatic 
power to twist and cite the international water law towards achieving state-centric political and 
economic benefit agendas. In this regard, Ethiopia’s assertion of her water projects by mentioning 
the Herman Doctrine, and equal and reasonable utilization of water, and Egypt’s adherence towards 
the historical acquired rights and duty not to cause significant harm notions, have been mentioned 
as instances. Hence, this chapter created a correlation between international water laws and hydro-
politics (especially their role in augmenting soft powers of bargaining and ideation powers). The 
third chapter of the thesis discussed about the water relations in the Eastern Nile basin nations from 
political, historical and legal perspectives. This study revealed that the relations of those nations 
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have been mainly focused on hydro-politics. Additionally, water agreements entered both during 
and post-colonial period were not inclusive of the upper riparian nations. Instead, they have a 
common feature in validating the water share interests Egypt and Sudan, plus served to establish 
Egypt’s hydro hegemony in the region. It has also been identified that there are still controversial 
water related  matters created by these treaties that have not yet been resolved and have an impact 
on the present water diplomacy relations among these nations.  
 
Moreover, the study points out the main reasons for the ineffectiveness of creating basin wide 
cooperation in the Nile as: First, the efforts of the NBI in addressing the core point of contentions 
between the downstream and upstream riparian are insignificant. Secondly, the introduction of the 
concept of equivocal terminology -  “water security” under the CFA provisions made the gap wider 
and instigated position split between the upper and lower riparian countries. Third, the negotiation 
process in the NBI and CFA institutions lacks efficiency. Fourth, the construction of the GERD is at 
the moment serving as a cradle in changing the bellicose history debate and has profound effect on 
the interaction among these riparian states. 
 
The theoretical analysis of chapter four found out that in terms of the four pillars of hydro 
hegemony power assessments, Egypt has a leading position in material, bargaining and ideation 
powers. Ethiopia surpasses Egypt and Sudan in geographic power due to her upstream position in 
the basin. Sudan has a relative better locational power position than Egypt. Observing the recent 
economic, political and social stability, the study shows that Ethiopia and Sudan are recording 
progressive change in their material, bargaining and ideation powers to the level they could contest 
and counter Egypt´s hydro-hegemony in the region. This is also contributing to stiff contestations 
amongst these nations to control and claim their share rights over the Nile water resource. The 
analysis also suggests that due to these changes, competitions for water that had been stifled for 
ages by the negative hydro-hegemonic tactics of Egypt have proven to be culminated. This finding 
is in line with the arguments asserted by (Cascão (2008)) that holds the economic progress and 
political stability of Ethiopia and Sudan have already been improved. This change is conspicuous in 
the case of Ethiopia as the country is empowering her material power further since in 1990s. This 
paradigm shift supplemented by the financial and technical support of China has brought an 
alteration in querying Egypt’s hydro hegemony in the basin.  
 
In consonance with this, the study suggests factors amenable for the unilateral decision of Ethiopia 
to build the GERD as: change in the growth of economic and material power strength of Ethiopia, 
the failure of basin wide cooperation especially the NBI’s underperformance in implementing 
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countries’ individual water project plans under its auspices, and Egypt’s securitization of Nile water 
issues which closes the door for dialogue and discussions on water share matters among these 
nations. These factors direct the upstream countries such as Ethiopia to develop their respective 
hydraulic infrastructures on the Nile basin without notifying and consulting  Egypt. In other words, 
on the top of the dam’s socio-economic benefit reasons, Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to build the 
biggest dam in Africa (GERD) for the production of hydroelectricity on the Nile River is one of the 
main practical engagement tactics of the country in countering Egypt’s hydro hegemony status quo. 
However, pursuant to Swain (2008), this policy of unilateral water development is both 
unsustainable and conflict inducing. Consequently, the reactions for the dam from Egypt and Sudan 
that arrays from avowal of full approval to threat of war.  
 
Thereupon, the Yoffe et.al’s water intensity scale methodology is employed to identify the conflict 
and cooperation interactions of Eastern Nile basin nations after the GERD. In general, this 
framework was developed to evaluate international river basins’ at potential risk for future conflict 
by studying historical conflict and cooperation scenarios. Nonetheless, this study has harnessed the 
framework to fit the specific paradigm of addressing the research question by quantifying the major 
event water interaction of the three Eastern Nile basin states. To do so, data were gathered from five 
selected international, government-based and regional media outlets between (2011) when Ethiopia 
started to build the dam till the end of 2015 (see the details under sub-section 4-2-4 above). As per 
to this study, the interaction events among/between these nations demonstrate that: First, once 
Ethiopia started to build the dam the average interaction between Ethiopia and Egypt was positive 
(1) in 2011 that signifies cooperation. Though Egypt opposes the constructions of any water 
projects on the Nile by the upstream countries inclusively of the GERD, there were a positive signal 
to settle the discord through water diplomacy and dialogue as the inauguration of the International 
Panel of Experts (IPoE) confirmed. However, this positive interaction was replaced by 
disagreements and threats of war upon the diversion of the river water by Ethiopia, which raised 
tensions between the two nations as the outcomes of their interaction quantification demonstrate (-
1), (-0.57) and (0) in 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively. However, their interaction has returned to 
positive (1) in 2015, which implies the improvement of their cooperative interaction through time.  
 
Second, quantity results of the thesis also attested that the interaction between Sudan and Ethiopia 
has always been positive designating the prevalence of cooperation between the two nations. This 
outcome of the study is in congruent with the theoretical analysis that explicates Sudan’s full 
avowal of support to Ethiopia’s dam. The main justification for their coherent relationship is that 
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Sudan will be benefited from importing hydro electricity power and yearlong regulation of flood of 
the Nile after the GERD is finalized.   
 
Third, interactions between Sudan and Egypt shows quantity number of less than or equal to (0) for 
the years 2012 to 2014 that displays the discord and tensions between them. This clarifies the rule 
that these two nations have a united stance with respect to any Nile water resource related matters 
and the GERD is proved to be an exception in proving their explicit disparity on this issues of water 
for the first time. However, this interaction has been later altered to cooperation as positive number 
(1) in 2015 result approves.  
 
Fourth, water intensity scale measurement of the three nations has demonstrated positive numbers 
through out the time frame covered. However, the positive scale number quantities have been 
diminished to (0) and (1) in 2012 and 2013, respectively. That signifies the political tension and 
discord especially between Ethiopia and Egypt when Ethiopia diverted the Nile water to construct 
the dam. This scenario proves the theoretical analysis and the position of Swain (2008) that the 
unilateral action of upstream countries in building water projects induces more tension and conflict 
among the sharing riparian nations especially when the lower riparian nations are more powerful 
than upper riparian nations, which is also true in our case. The political tension and threat of war 
mounted high between Egypt and Ethiopia during those periods as we can infer it from both the 
theoretical and quantitative discussions under chapter four.  
 
However, the data collected to measure the interaction of these nations are limited to selected media 
outlets within specified period of time. The writer believes that this study only shows the partial 
pictures of water-based interactions among these nations. Thus, interviews of the appropriate 
political and professional personalities from these nations would have been further augment the 
clarity and predictability of the study (which this research fail to encompass them due to resource 
constraints). Besides, the construction of the GERD has not yet completed, water diplomacy and 
negotiations are still underway. The unpredictability of these states’ interactions makes arduous to 
forecast the future prospectus of their interaction. These circumstances restrict the applicability of 
the research only to its specified time frame.  
 
Nonetheless, the thesis has opened a new avenue in applying the Yoffe et.al’s water conflict 
intensity scale to measure the conflict or cooperation of riparian states in specific water 
development project (GERD) in a particular basin system (the Nile). Hence, it will contribute for 
future basin–wide cooperation and conflict intensity studies by incorporating recent and upcoming 
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hydro-political and diplomatic developments amongst the basin sharing nations. Detail studies in 
the basin system plays a decisive role in absolving basin wide hydro-political controversies that in 
turn contributes for prospective regional integration, which currently lacks in the Nile. This study 
could also serve as a basis for future further researches based upon the implications of the GERD 
upon its completion on the regional cooperation and conflict scenarios by extending the time frame 
and increasing the number of countries involving in the case analysis such as South Sudan. 
 
 From all the qualitative and quantitative analysis of this research, it is feasible to suggest that the 
construction of the GERD on the Nile River is relatively paving the way for more prosperous water 
based dialogues to thrive in the Eastern Nile basin with in the time frame this study covers.  It is 
also opening the doors for the enrichment of congruous political, economic and social relations 
among these states. Increasingly both the multi-lateral and bilateral interactions of the Eastern Nile 
nations signify the enhancement of state collaborations. Cooperative agreements not only on the 
GERD but also in other social, economic, military and political sectors, are also amplifying the 
development of trust and dependence among these states. The study has also witnessed Egypt’s 
increasing de-securitization of Nile water resource matters especially the incorporation of equitable 
and reasonable utilization of water resources in the 2015 tripartite agreement and Egypt’s 
continuing open water diplomacy about the dam verify. This shift will also play a crucial role in 
opening future dialogues among the basin-wide nations that in turn strengthen the regional 
integration to flourish. Hence, the forecasts of some scholars about the inevitability of war among 
these nations especially between Ethiopia and Egypt due to the construction of the GERD have 
been debarred at least for the time frame this study covers (as this study proves a contraio).  
 
To sum it up, the evidences of this study suggests that  the construction of the GERD is 
progressively germinal to open dialogue, trust building and cooperation on water share matters 
among these nations. This serves as a mechanism for the durability of peace and security, and 
regional integration in the Eastern Nile rather than inducing disputes and frictions. However, the 
GERD is still under construction, there are also issues related to it these nations have not yet settled 
them. Thus, looking at the future through rose-colored glasses, the GERD directs more to the bright 
and cooperative relations among these nations but it is still arduous to rely completely on the 
positive  assertion. Because this study at hand has also revealed the complexity, at times 
unpredictability and tense hydro-politics relations and competitions of these nations especially after 
Ethiopia initiated the construction of the GERD.  
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